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ABSTRACT
MULTISCALE MODELING OF HUMAN ADDICTION: A COMPUTATIONAL
HYPOTHESIS FOR ALLOSTASIS AND HEALING
FEBRUARY 2013
YARIV Z. LEVY
B.Sc., ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE FEDERALE DE LAUSANNE
M.Sc., ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE FEDERALE DE LAUSANNE
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Andrew G. Barto and Professor Jerrold S. Meyer

This dissertation presents a computational multiscale framework for
predicting behavioral tendencies related to human addiction. The research
encompasses three main contributions. The first contribution presents a formal,
heuristic, and exploratory framework to conduct interdisciplinary investigations
about the neuropsychological, cognitive, behavioral, and recovery constituents of
addiction. The second contribution proposes a computational framework to
account for real-life recoveries that are not dependent on pharmaceutical, clinical,
and counseling support. This exploration relies upon a combination of current
biological beliefs together with unorthodox rehabilitation practices, such as
meditation, and proposes a conjecture regarding possible cognitive mechanisms
involved in the recovery process. Further elaboration of this investigation leads
on to the third contribution, which introduces a computational hypothesis for
exploring the allostatic theory of addiction. A person engaging in drug
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consumption is likely to encounter mood deterioration and eventually to suffer the
loss of a reasonable functional state (e.g., experience depression). The allostatic
theory describes how the consumption of abusive substances modifies the
brain's reward system by means of two mechanisms which aim to viably maintain
the functional state of an addict. The first mechanism is initiated in the reward
system itself, whereas the second might originate in the endocrine system or
elsewhere. The proposed computational hypothesis indicates that the first
mechanism can explain the functional stabilization of the addict, whereas the
second mechanism is a candidate for a source of possible recovery.
The formal arguments presented in this dissertation are illustrated by
simulations which delineate archetypal patterns of human behavior toward drug
consumption: escalation of use and influence of conventional and alternative
rehabilitation treatments. Results obtained from this computational framework
encourage an integrative approach to drug rehabilitation therapies which
combine conventional therapies with alternative practices to achieve higher rates
of consumption cessation and lower rates of relapse.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Use and misuse of addictive substances has been an ongoing
phenomenon throughout the history of mankind from early civilizations to the
present. While addiction has been widely regarded as detrimental and even
criminal, science and popular beliefs have recently converged to consider
addiction as a disease (1,2). Advances in social sciences, psychology,
pharmacology, and physiology are continually providing new insight into the
nature of addictive drugs and the consequences of their consumption. Extensive
computational

research

has

been

conducted

which

deals

with

the

neuropsychological, cognitive, behavioral and recovery aspects or scales of drug
addiction. In the present document these scales presented in Figure 1 are
defined as follows:
•

The neuropsychological scale describes the ongoing activity of the
relevant neural structures, which include the brain's reward system;

•

The cognitive scale outlines the processing and integration of the
neural activity, mimicking regions of the frontal cortex;

•

The behavioral scale delineates the conduct of an individual, with
respect to itself and the surrounding society;

•

The recovery scale refers to possible interventions which prevent
maladaptive behavior (i.e., the tendency to consume a drug).

1

Figure 1: Neuropsychological, cognitive, behavioral and recovery scales are the four aspects
considered in mathematical and computational models of addiction. Actual models of addiction
commonly embrace one or two of these aspects.

Up to now, mathematical and computational models of addiction have
considered only one or two of these scales. Effective use of the knowledge from
these diverse facets to understand and treat drug addictions presents a daunting
challenge: many aspects of this complex phenomenon are interrelated and time
dependent. Moreover, a trade-off between a model's mathematical properties
and its biological rationality should be found: a pertinent computational
framework shouldn't be excessively complex, while allowing the model to
simulate a significant diversity of behavioral profiles.
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In the present dissertation, computational methods are used to integrate
all four archetypal aspects of drug addiction into a comprehensive and
translational

multiscale

model

combining

neuropsychological,

cognitive,

behavioral, and recovery observations, toward the prediction of drug-seeking
behavior. It is expected that the results of this research will expand the
understanding of substance addiction, with particular emphasis on cognitive
correlations of the allostatic theory of addiction (3).
This chapter starts with an historic overlook of human drug dependency,
continues with a glimpse of how computer science is deployed in biological
investigations, and concludes with a description of the scientific contributions
provided by this dissertation. Chapter 2 gives a background of the biological
modeling of drug addiction; and Chapter 3 discusses previous formal models. In
Chapter 4 are outlined the formal procedures engaged in developing the new
formal framework discussed in this dissertation. Chapter 5 puts forward a
cognitive learning mechanism as a necessary apparatus for emulating natural
recoveries from drug addiction, where no pharmacological or behavioral
interventions are employed. Chapter 6 computationally explores the allostatic
theory of addiction and provides behavioral predictions with respect to cognitive
correlates. Finally, Chapter 7 includes summary and conclusions of this
dissertation.

3

!
1.1 Historical account of addiction in humankind
The lawful or illegal consumption of substances such as caffeine, alcohol,
amphetamines, barbiturates, cocaine, and opium alkaloids can be traced back
about 7000 years. The earliest documented evidence of addictive substance
availability can be traced back to the Sumerian, Ancient Egyptian, and Ancient
Chinese civilizations, involving opium, alcohol, and theine (caffeine1).
Around the year 5000 B.C. in Mesopotamia, the Sumerian civilization
developed agriculture which significantly increased land productivity and the
need to store sustenance surpluses. This prosperity led to the establishment of
community life with permanent places of residence, as well as the need for a
higher level of social organization and labor division. This new socio-economic
organization facilitated cultural development and the invention of phonetic writing.
The Sumerian written character for opium was associated with "rejoicing" (4).
By about 3500 B.C., the nearby Ancient Egypt civilization had new
architectural techniques, a system of mathematics, a system of medicine, the first
known ships, glass technology, and the earliest evidence of alcohol production in
the form of a papyrus describing a brewery (5).
In a different part of the world sometime later in about 2000 B.C., the ruler
of Ancient China, Shen Nong, known as the Emperor of the Five Grains, taught
his people how to cultivate cereals, which led to the decrease in slaughtering of
animals. The Emperor discovered many medicinal herbs and was accustomed to
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

Theine was shown to have the same composition as caffeine in 1868. (Not to be confused with
Theanine.)
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boiling his water before drinking. It is believed that on one occasion some herbal
leaves fell into his boiling water, he drank the brew, and he liked it (6).
Western civilization dates back to Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome,
which were endowed not only with schools of art, philosophy, and rhetoric, but
also with knowledge of the curative properties of plants and their euphoric
characteristics. These societies had practical knowledge of the hallucinatory and
temporary psychotic effects in opium poppies, ergot2, mushrooms, and deadly
nightshade3 (7). The epic poet Homer cited the intoxicating, pain-relieving and
sleep-inducing properties of these substances in The Iliad and The Odyssey,
while the classical Roman poet Virgil mentioned them in The Aeneid (4).
Opium, alcohol and theine (caffeine) were known substances from the
earliest time of the human civilization and their use has been celebrated, studied,
and debated ever since.
More recently in 1821, the Englishman Thomas De Quincey wrote
"Confessions of an English Opium Eater" (8,9), an account of his controlled
laudanum4 consumption and the effects on his life. At that time, it was not
uncommon and even socially acceptable among Romantic writers to use opioids
for both recreational and medical purposes. Some years later, from 1839 to 1842
and from 1856 to 1858, Britain declared two Opium Wars on China: under the
pretext of enforcing anti-opium laws issued by the Chinese Emperor. These laws,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2

A group of fungi used as a source of certain alkaloids.
A plant used as a recreational drug because of the vivid hallucinations and delirium that it
produces.
4
Defined by the New Oxford American Dictionary as "an alcoholic solution containing morphine,
prepared from opium and used as a narcotic painkiller".
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which were intended to decrease the large quantities of opium imported from
India to China, indirectly affected British trading policy and eventually provided
the pretext for Britain's military pursuit of commercial imperialism (10).
The first international alcoholism congress was held in Paris in 1878, and
28 years later the first international association for drug regulation was founded in
Lausanne, Switzerland. Alcohol was never considered for international
regulation, but opioids were. In the early 1900s, the Shanghai Opium
Commission was established, and before World War I it became a global
regulatory system. This control institution evolved into a preclusive authority
during World War II (10).
The history of addictive substance use and abuse in the United States
dates back almost 150 year to the American Civil War. Wounded veterans were
legally given morphine-containing bundles for pain relief, and the first legal
measure against substance abuse that was at least partially instigated by this
medical practice dates back to 1875 when San Francisco opium dens were made
illegal. Towards the end of the 19th century, substances such as morphine,
laudanum, and cocaine were being legally used for pain relief and other medical
purposes (e.g. heroin based cough syrup, cocaine toothache drops, etc.), the
problem of addiction started to be recognized, and commercial drug regulation
was begun. In 1906 the management of drug labeling was enforced with the
passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act; in 1914 the legal distribution and use of
opioids and cocaine became regulated by the Harrison Act; in 1920 the 18th
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Constitutional Amendment banned most alcohol sales until 1933 (Prohibition);
and in 1970 the Drug Enforcement Administration was created by the Controlled
Substances Act in response to the growing availability and consumption of illegal
drugs and increasing problems with addiction. The Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986
and 1988 increased funding for drug treatment and rehabilitation and provided for
the creation of the Office of National Drug Control Policy with responsibility for
coordinating the national drug control policy (11,12).
A major shift occurred during the early 1950s when the World Health
Organization (WHO) declared alcoholism as a disease. Already around 1870, the
American Association for the Cure of Inebriates defined alcoholism as a disease.
Even earlier, during the Age of Enlightenment, drunkenness was discussed as a
disease (11,13). These views faded until the late 1990s, when the National
Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) presented neuroscience and behavioral science
evidence to promote this concept to the general public, politicians, and
healthcare professionals (1). It was in 2004 that the WHO defined substance
dependence as a disorder of the brain (14). Presently, addiction is considered a
"bio-psycho-social-spiritual disorder" (2,15).
The use of addictive substances affects a very large portion of the
population. Of the three substances discussed above (opium, alcohol, and
theine-caffeine), caffeine is by far the most commonly used psychoactive
substance, consumed daily by approximately 80% of the world's adult population
(~3.5 billion). Moreover, it is estimated that 15-21 million people used opiates at
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least once in 2007 and that about 76 million persons were diagnosed with alcohol
use disorders in 2004. Other addictive substances in wide use include cocaine,
amphetamines-group substances, and ecstasy-group drugs, with estimated
worldwide use in 2007 between 16 and 21 million, 16 and 51 million, and 12 and
24 million, respectively. In the USA, these translate into a cost of approximately
$181 billion for illicit drugs, $168 billion for tobacco, and $185 billion for alcohol
(16,17,18). It should be noted that these estimates include only direct costs and
disregard social, economic, and health implications associated with other factors
such as deaths due to overdose or other complications from drug use (19).

1.2 Maturing out of addiction and natural recoveries
Nowadays, untreated recoveries from drug abuse are referred as "natural
recoveries" (20,21). The first phenomenological instances were noticed in
narcotics users and were referred as "maturing out of addiction" by Winick (22).
Similar observations were successively noted and investigated also for other
substances of abuse, such as alcohol and cocaine (23).
In 1962, Winick popularized the phenomenon of maturing out of narcotics
addiction. His studies revealed cases where regular users of opium derivatives
such as heroin, and of synthetic opiates such as meperidine, ceased to use the
addictive substance without any psychological or pharmacological treatment (22).
In 1980, Maddux and Desmond presented in the same venue an investigation
discussing the possible overestimation present in the statistics of the original

8

study, and proposed further data to increase the accuracy of the description of
this phenomenon (24).
In the two decades between theses studies, a number of studies were
undertaken whose results were exceedingly dissimilar, arguing against a unified
theory describing this type of phenomenon. The graph presented in Figure 2
plots the percentage of addicts becoming narcotics-abstinent against the followup period of the correspondent study, for 10 representative studies of maturing
out of addiction listed in Table 1 of (25). The present dissertation focuses on the
studies of Winick (red circle) and of Maddux and Desmond (blue plus sign), by
integrating them and utilizing them within a computational framework to study
natural recoveries from addiction in humans.

Figure 2: Recapitulation of 10 investigations of maturing out from heroin addiction undertaken
between 1962-1980. These data were reported in (25). The percentage of former addicts
achieving inactive status is plotted as a function of the investigation's lengths. The red circle
corresponds to data in (22), the blue plus sign to data in (24), and the two united black dots to a
study for which the follow-up period of the patients was distributed in the range 1 to 4.5 years.
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1.3 Contributions
This dissertation presents three main contributions. The first one is a fivestep procedure to convey biological and sociological correlates of addiction into a
reliable computational framework. The second contribution encompasses a
theoretical examination of unexplained cessation from drug consumption in the
absence of medical and professional support, a phenomenon known as maturing
out of addiction (22). The third and most significant contribution is a
computational hypothesis to account for the allostatic theory of addiction (3). The
present dissertation relates to the field of Computational Biology, which the
National Institute of Health defines as
"... the development and application of data-analytical and theoretical
methods, mathematical modeling and computational simulation
techniques to the study of biological, behavioral, and social systems" (26).

First contribution. The five-step procedure illustrated in Chapter 4
consists of formalization, expansion, qualitative validation, dynamical property
analysis, and sensitivity analysis. The biological processes previously described
by Levy5 and Siegelmann in (27) are used to define the experimental framework
of the computational model at the center of this dissertation. The formalization of
these biological processes, presented in (28) and Appendix A, is organized into a
multiscale model of drug addiction which includes four levels of observations:
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5

Dino J. Levy
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neuropsychological,

cognitive,

behavioral,

and

recovery.

Such

formal

organization, advanced in (29), promotes the clarity of the model and strengthens
the interdisciplinary perspective on this disease. In order to enhance the
biological plausibility of the experimental framework previously described by
Levy5 and Siegelmann (27), the model is enhanced with a more realistic
behavioral scale. This elaboration, detailed in (29), is a demonstration of the
model's expandability. In particular, the compulsion component of the model is
enhanced to include elements of the incentive-sensitization theory of addiction,
and the inhibition component of the model is enhanced to include developmental
and biosocial elements (29). A conventional quantitative evaluation of the model
is not possible to perform because the measure of several parameters defining
the model is not available at this time. Instead, a qualitative validation of the
model qualitative done to the extent possible was performed which involves
computational simulations mimicking real-life patterns of drug abuse and their
qualitative assessment. Initial explorations of qualitative validation are detailed in
(29,30) and further developed in (31,32). The dynamic behavior of the system is
assessed by testing how the framework converges toward a particular state of
healthy or maladaptive behavior, and by examining how changes in the virtual
subject's state influence fluctuations of the predicted behavior toward drug
consumption, as described in (30). A sensitivity examination of the model, which
considers both its phenomenological and mathematical characteristics, illustrates
in (31) how a portion of the model could undermine the entire framework if not
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properly calibrated. A functional constraint and a visualization tool are proposed
as a means to identify and control this possible issue (31).
This first contribution addresses a fundamental step of modeling: the
framework's validation. According to Zeigler et al. (33), the validation step
typically requires a significant correspondence between experimental data and
computational simulations to "check if the model is in error". The discussed fivestep procedure analyzes and evaluates the model in order to provide as strong
an argument as possible in favor of the system's validity.

Second contribution. The preliminary recovery scale presented in (28) is
enhanced to connect current drug-related neurological beliefs related to the
neural plasticity of the brain's frontal cortex (34) with sociological studies
describing natural recoveries from opioids (22,24). This contribution, detailed in
Chapter 5 and in (32), results in a theoretical look at how episodes of maturing
out of addiction may be triggered by non-conventional treatments (e.g.,
mindfulness-based cognitive techniques) emulated through a hypothetical
learning mechanism. Even though speculative, this contribution provides support
for the biological hypothesis that there is a cognitive learning mechanism, in the
prefrontal cortex, which influences decision-making processes associated with
drug abuse (32). This contribution constitutes a proof of concept in line with past
and current opinions encouraging stronger interactions between social, natural,
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and formal sciences for characterizing a disease such as drug addiction
(35,15,36).

Third contribution. The third and main contribution of this dissertation is
a computational hypothesis related to allostasis (3), a neuroscientific theory
outlining how the brain's reward system reorganizes as drug intake progresses.
The computational framework discussed in this dissertation is further elaborated
to incorporate a pharmacokinetic/pharmacodynamic animal model of allostasis
previously developed by Ahmed and Koob (37). This expansion corresponds to a
theoretical translation of the animal model discussed in (37) toward human
application. The augmented model, detailed in Chapter 6 and (38), assesses
mood variations and drug consumption rates of a virtual subject, while providing
biologically plausible and testable hypotheses related to allostasis in humans.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND: BIOLOGICAL MODELS OF ADDICTION

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV)
defines two types of maladaptive substance use: "substance abuse" and
"substance dependence" (39). Both definitions include distinctive behavioral
aspects. Substance abuse can manifest itself in reckless, negligent, unreliable,
delinquent, or confrontational behavior. Substance dependence can present itself
in eager, greedy, perfervid, zealous, or gluttonous behavior towards the addictive
drug. Typically the word addiction refers to substance dependence. The transition
from substance abuse to addiction is characterized by a significant increase in
the time and energies invested by an individual to come into possession and use,
or recover from the substance, along with the increase of the subject's tolerance
to the drug and correspondent enlargement of its consumed amount. Patterns of
drug use not only depend on the maladaptive state of the individual but also on
the particular substance. Drugs such as nicotine and opiates are usually taken by
humans according to a schedule, whereas others including alcohol, cocaine, and
amphetamines may be taken intermittently. The common behavioral patterns
encountered by a drug user include recreational, binge, regular or heavy use,
recovery, and relapse. These behavioral patterns are defined by the aggregation
of biological, psychological, and social elements, which jointly establish the
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individual's state driving the desire or willingness to engage with the addictive
drug.
Researchers investigating the elements responsible for substance
dependence began to evaluate and estimate the inherent features of addiction by
observing natural phenomena such as medical conditions, psychological
deviations, and social awareness.
In 1968, Siegler and Osmond described seven models of drug addiction:
one medical model, one socio-psychological model, and five moral models (40).
The medical model considers the addict as a patient and addiction as a chronic
disease which can be caused by contact with an addictive drug, but where
predisposition factors and relevant chemical processes are unknown. As written
by Siegler and Osmond, the socio-psychological model considers the addict as a
"victim of social forces beyond his control" (40), an individual with strong
personality problems related to substance dependencies and influenced by social
class, neighborhood, age, and mental health. The five moral models are the
retributive, deterrent, restitutive, preventive, and restorative models. These
frameworks respectively describe the addict as a convicted criminal, a bad
example, a debtor, a failure in moral education, or a wrongdoer, and the set of
causes to become an addict include moral failure and lack of deterrence or moral
instruction.
Twelve years later, in 1980, the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA)
published its 30th Research Monograph with a collection of articles providing a
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more comprehensive perspective of drug addiction. This collection considers 43
different theories of addiction which together encompass more than 13 distinct
centers of interests such as psychiatry, psychology, sociology, biomedical
sciences, neurosciences, etc. (41).
In their 2005 book on psychopharmacology, Meyer and Quenzer describe
the most prominent views of addiction: the physical dependence model, the
positive reinforcement model, the incentive-sensitization model, the opponentprocess model, the allostatic model, and the disease model (11). These six
models and a more recently developed view of addiction, the impaired response
inhibition and salience attribution (I-RISA) model (34), are described below.
The neuropsychological scale of the model at the center of this
investigation relates to the physical dependence and disease models, the
cognitive scale relates to the positive reinforcement and the I-RISA models, and
the behavioral scale relates to the allostatic and, by extension, the opponentprocess models.

2.1 The physical dependence model
The physical dependence model describes addiction in terms of relapse
and comprises two concepts related to withdrawal symptoms, which are the
unpleasant physical reactions that generally occur after ceasing to take an
addictive substance. The first concept relates to relapse as mean to alleviate
physical reaction to abstinence that typically occurs shortly after the drug has
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been discontinued. In this case, relapse occurs when the addict which is
struggling to cope with distressing withdrawal symptoms resumes drug intakes to
alleviate this pain. The unwanted pain is removed, but the subject is once again
exposed to addiction. The second concept delineates cases of relapse due to
conditioned withdrawal, which usually occurs after the addict has been drug-free
for a significant time. In this case, physical reactions to abstinence occur in
particular places, and hence the subject develops a classical conditioning
between addictive substance and location. Even after a long drug free period, a
former addict may be subject to drug cravings which arise when in previously
drug-conditioned locations. Research related to the physical dependence model
emphasizes how brain regions including the amygdala, the anterior cingulate
cortex, and the basal ganglia are particularly active during conditioned withdrawal
episodes.
There are two main critiques of the physical dependence model. First,
there are no insights into the processes that occur when the subject experiences
drugs for the first time. This model can explain the maintenance of an addiction,
but cannot account for the changes that occur to the addict-to-be. Second, this
model assumes strong physical dependence on the abused substance, and thus
fails to consider drugs such as cocaine which do not produce a strong physical
dependence (11).
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2.2 The positive reinforcement model
According to this model, the euphoric state experienced after drug intake
reinforces actions that preceded the substance administration. In other words,
repeated drug intake induces a desire by the subject to experience again the
euphoric state and to engage again in the course of actions that led to the drug
intake. Furthermore, in case of an attempt to cease using the substance, the
subject will experience a craving caused by the overwhelming desire to attain
again the feeling of wellbeing caused by the drug.
Behavioral studies focused on the development of this model used rodents
and primates. For a limited amount of time each day, the test subject was given
free access to intravenous drug injections administered through an accessible
lever. A precise amount of drug was injected into the bloodstream of the subject
when the bar was pressed. The action of pressing the lever can provide the drug:
for example, one dose of drug is delivered for every five lever presses. Thus it
was possible to measure the relative strength of substance reinforcement effects.
This reinforcement eventually reached its upper limit (threshold) when the animal
stopped pressing the lever, presumably because the reward acquired to achieve
this action did not justify the effort: the effort required for receiving the actual drug
(reward) was too large with respect to the drug dose provided. For the same ratio
between real and empty injections, an animal was generally found to have a
higher perseverance to press the lever when the dose provided in the actual drug
injection was higher. While clearly illustrating the role of positive reinforcement,
this model neglects the social effects of drug abuse, which can have negative
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real life consequences in the career of a drug user, family breakups, professional
and financial problems, health issues, engagement in criminal activities, etc. (11).

2.3 The incentive-sensitization model
The incentive-sensitization theory of addiction is grounded on the
distinction between drug liking and drug wanting or, more specifically, between
the euphoric sensation that arises while taking a drug and the powerful desire to
take the drug again. This theory, formulated by Robinson and Berridge (42),
states that during the establishment of the addictive state, the "wanting" level of a
subject strongly increases, while the "liking" level stays constant or even slightly
decreases (42,43,44). The discrepancy between these two processes is believed
to originate at the level of neural pathways within the brain. Since it is known that
the mesolimbic dopamine pathway can be sensitized by repeated intakes of
addictive substances, this framework justifies the hypothesis for which this
particular neural circuit could be more important to drug wanting rather than for
drug liking. The psychological process called "incentive salience", which leads
the subject to a wanting state, may be caused by long-lasting neuroadaptations
and could explain why it is difficult for a former addict to avoid relapse episodes.
While supported by strong experimental data from both animal and human
studies, the accuracy of this model might substantially benefit by considering
additional psychosocial factors interacting with the biology of addiction (11).
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In the computational model presented in this document, the incentivesensitization theory partially defines the behavioral scale: the compulsive
component within that scale is described as the average of the "wanting" and the
"liking" processes.

2.4 The opponent-process model
The opponent-process model for drug addiction is also relevant to
motivation in general. Similar to the incentive-sensitization model, it involves two
processes which are different instead of complementary.
In the early 1970s Solomon and Corbit introduced the opponent-process
theory of motivation to describes how the affective homeostatic state of an
individual is maintained by
"... many systems in the brain, the business of which it is to suppress or
reduce all excursions from hedonic neutrality, whether those excursions
be appetitive or aversive, pleasant or unpleasant" (45).

This psychological framework considers the emotional reaction to a
stimulus as the sum of two elements: an a-process which occurs immediately
after the event, and a b-process which begins after a slight delay at a slower rate
with a reversed hedonic magnitude. Drug intake initially causes large and positive
a-processes that gradually diminish due to the subject's increasing tolerance to
the substance. The corresponding b-processes are minor at first, but their
intensity and duration grow with continued use of the substance. The opponent-
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process framework properly predicts that repetitive drug intake can diminish the
euphoric state originated by an addictive substance and eventually cause
withdrawal symptoms, but it fails to account for the transitions in the gradual
development of a dependency whereby in initial stages drugs are experienced to
feel high but subsequently become used to feel normal. This model assumes that
the hedonic homeostatic state of an addict persists and remains unimpaired over
time even though every drug intake perturbs it. In other words, the baseline
around which the a- and b-processes fluctuate remains constant.

2.5 The allostatic model
The principle of allostasis was established to enhance the homeostatic
model whereby the well-balanced functional state of a living being is sustained by
the constant conservation of the organism's inner environment. Each divergence
from the normal state of the organism is counterbalanced by negative feedback
mechanisms which support the reinstatement of original setpoints. Instead, the
allostatic model advances that the internal state of the organism continuously
adapts to the surrounding natural world, attaining functional stability through the
adaptation of physiological thresholds (46). Allostasis, as defined by Sterling and
Eyer,
"... provides for continuous re-evaluation of need and for continuous
readjustment of all parameters toward new setpoints" (46).
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In humans, this continuous adaptation to the environment is reached by
means of neural and endocrine processes that are able to take priority over
homeostatic regulations (46).
According to the hypothesis put forward by Koob and colleagues, a drug
addict attains the allostatic state by means of the chronic deviation of their
hedonic baseline. The addict's physiological state is maintained operative by
means of this affective adaptation, rather than by reinstatement of the original
homeostatic balance. Symptoms of allostasis are manifested by changes in the
addict's mood or state of mind (3). The concept of allostasis enhances the
opponent-process model with neurobiological findings and similarly, but more
comprehensively, accounts for the transitions in the gradual development of a
dependency whereby drugs are first experienced to feel high but subsequently to
feel normal. The allostatic framework of addiction relies on changes observed in
the subject's nervous and endocrinal systems which occur as addiction
perpetuates, causing continuous and progressive distortions of the subject's
affective state (47). The raison d'être of these distortions is to guarantee the
functional stability of the organism while its hedonic homeostatic state is
corrupted.
The hedonic effect of an addictive substance on the brain's reward system
is orchestrated by within-system neuroadaptations and between-system
neuroadaptations (48). Experimental observations show that rats undergo a
continuous degradation of hedonic valence during extended periods of cocaine
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consumption (49). Similarly, the negative hedonic valence of the individual is
increased by within-system and between-system neuroadaptations, and
chronically impacts the person's mood (3). Initial drug consumption disrupts the
normal synaptic physiology of the reward system (50) which aims to reinstate its
equilibrium by means of within-system neuroadaptations (48). Within-system
adaptations act at the molecular or cellular level defining the brain reward
circuitry (51) and increase the magnitude of the ideal threshold of the reward
(37). For instance, if the effect of the consumed drug of abuse relies on the
availability of a particular neurotransmitter, within-system adaptations will
diminish its amount within the reward system (52). With repeated drug
administration the reward system becomes accustomed to extended activations
of the within-system component, which eventually causes withdrawal symptoms
during periods of abstinence (48). Dopamine in the nucleus accumbens (NAc)
and extended amygdala plays an important role in within-system adaptations
(53). As consumption further advances, the brain's expectation for future rewards
increases and within-system neuroadaptations become progressively inadequate
and eventually fail to provide the individual with a well-adjusted functional state.
Due to deficiencies of within-system adaptations, brain structures different
than the one defining the reward system are recruited through the deployment of
between-system neuroadaptations to further counterbalance the effect of the
drug (48). These brain structures, delineated by Koob and Le Moal, embody the
"anti-reward systems" (54). Between-system adaptations increase the baseline
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reward threshold (37) and originate in the brain stress system (48). For example,
if a drug has a particular effect on the reward circuit, between-system activations
could promote a hormonal response leading to the opposite effect (52). The
corticotropin-releasing factor operating in the amygdala, stria terminalis, and
ventral tegmental area (VTA) plays an important role in between-system
adaptations (53).

2.6 The disease model
The disease model has been accepted as a valid perspective on addiction
after a few failed introductory attempts, as discussed in the historical overview
above. Jellinek's research about alcoholism published in 1960 began this
successful ascent by proposing a straightforward definition of alcoholism and a
corresponding taxonomy (55,56).
Jellinek's description of alcoholism includes two characteristics:
"... one is drinking and the other is damage (individual or social, or both)
incumbent upon the drinking" (55).

This interpretation was received as a significant upgrade of the precursor
moral model that considered the addict an individual with weak mental and moral
qualities. The proposed classification includes five grades of alcoholism which in
increasing order of severity are: alpha, beta, gamma, delta, and epsilon
alcoholism. These five categories are organized with respect of three main
questions:
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•

What causes a person to become an alcoholic?

•

What are the processes involved?

•

What are the implicated damages?

The recognized causes encompass psychological, physiological, sociocultural, and economical domains; the involved processes embrace tolerance,
loss of control, physical versus psychological dependence, nutritional and
physical habits; and the damages include physical and/or mental, and socioeconomic types (55).
Jellinek's classification of alcoholism provided an early distinction between
"chronic alcoholism" (up to beta alcoholism) correlated with physical and
behavioral consequences of long-term alcohol use, and "alcohol addiction"
(starting from gamma alcoholism) related to craving and lack of control (55).
Nowadays the disease model is a main reference in scientific research,
professional treatments, self-help groups, and also mass media. Early disease
models considered the addict as a human being inclined to the use and misuse
of drugs mostly because of an inherited susceptibility, and are referred to as
susceptibility models. With the blooming of neuroscientific investigations it
became apparent that long-term drug use causes significant changes in the
structure and functioning of the addict's brain. These findings supported the
evolution of susceptibility models into exposure models, which consider the
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changes occurring at the neural substrate level of a long-standing drug user as
accountable for the addictive behavior of the subject (11).
The advancement that the field of neuroscience underwent from the late
1970s drove the adaptation of the disease model into the "brain disease" (1)
model, as expressed by Leshner in the late 1990s. Investigations relaying on
laboratory animal data and on human brain imaging techniques promoted the
understanding of the substance abuse cycle, including involved ionotropic and
metabotropic mechanisms (50). The enhanced neurobiological comprehension of
the addict's states (e.g., loss of control, drug craving, and withdrawal symptoms)
promoted and delineated new pharmacological treatments and facilitated the
progress of health practices related to addiction (57).
The brain disease model of addiction positively influences society, heath
care, and research, even though a recent study warns about a possible adverse
effect: the progressive instauration of a view of addiction exclusively centered on
brain studies (58). Such an exclusive view could diminish important contributions
from fields such as psychology or sociology which are equally significant towards
a better understanding of this phenomenon. Moreover, assigning to an addict the
category of a person with a brain disease could result in an increased ostracism
among human beings addicted to drugs (59). An interdisciplinary attitude
including features ranging from neuroadaptations to socio-economic context,
including biological, psychological, and social elements, was discussed as a
pragmatic candidate to avoid such unwanted outcome (36).
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2.7 The impaired response inhibition and salience attribution model
In their 2002 review, Goldstein and Volkow describe neuroimaging studies
that support a new conceptualization of addiction, designated as I-RISA. In
addition to the limbic system, until that point believed to represent the essential
neural structure involved in addiction, the authors discuss the involvement of
another brain region: the frontal cortex. The I-RISA model hypothesizes two
processes to explain how the state of an addict cycles with a positive feedback
from drug intoxication to drug craving, to compulsive drug administration, to drug
withdrawal, and again to intoxication. Goldstein and Volkow state that these two
processes are the
"... loss of self-directed/willed behaviors to automatic sensory-driven
formulas" and the "attribution of primary salience to the drug of abuse at
the expense of other available rewarding stimuli" (34).

The first process relies on observed changes within the mesolimbic and
mesocortical dopaminic pathways which suggest that an addict expresses a
different response inhibition with respect to a healthy individual. Presented with
the same stimulus (a drug of abuse), the neural substrate of the addict will
facilitate the behavior leading to the immediate reward (drug intake), whereas the
neural substrate of the healthy individual will more carefully ponder such
immediate reward since it is potentially harmful in a longer term.
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The second process depends on the alterations observed within the
orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate cortices (regions active in cognitive,
emotional, and decision-making processes) which suggest that an addict and a
healthy individual have contrasting saliencies while attributing reward values to
emotional matters (34).
Even though prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate gyrus consistently
show activation during drug intoxication, cocaine abusers experiencing craving
express a higher neural activity and a different glucose metabolism in these brain
regions than do healthy individuals. Withdrawing cocaine users exhibit a lower
cerebral blood flow than healthy subjects in the prefrontal and lateral frontal
cortices, and as the cessation period become longer; they also exhibit a higher
glucose metabolism in the orbitofrontal cortex and in the striatum, as opposed to
healthy subjects.
With respect to a healthy individual, the neural differences observed in
addicted subjects suggest that an addict is more likely to experience cognitive
distortions leading to a misjudged reward evaluation for drug intakes to the
disadvantage of non-drug stimuli. With respect to the computational model
advanced in the present investigation, the I-RISA view of drug addiction supports
the conjecture of a cognitive level which integrates neural activities that define
the subject's drug-seeking behavior.
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CHAPTER 3
RELATED WORK: COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF ADDICTION

Technological advances and the consequent increase in the quality and
quantity of data describing multiple characteristics of addiction have enabled
researchers to use mathematical and computational tools to further advance the
study of drug abuse. Computational techniques are widely accepted as valid
tools to describe and predict processes associated with drug dependences (60),
as well as other mental (61) and physical (62) diseases.
It has been recently proposed (63) that existing computational models of
addiction which consider dopaminergic signaling as having an essential role can
be organized into three different families: quantitative pharmacological models,
abstract models of dopamine functions, and knowledge repository models. Here
this categorization of formal models is expanded to include two additional families
– epidemiological and economic models – which do not explicitly take into
consideration the dopaminergic effects, but are pertinent to comprehensively
understanding how computational descriptions of addiction can further advance
this field of study. Hereafter these five categories, shown in Figure 3, are
described and discussed. For the most part, these computational models take
into consideration one or two of the scales of observations described in Figure 1.
A pragmatic approach to integrate all these scales into one formal framework is
discussed at the end of this chapter, and resides in knowledge repository models.
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Figure 3: Epidemiological, economic, pharmacological, dopaminergic, and knowledge repository
models of addiction. Current models are mostly concerned with two scales of observations
(neuropsychology, cognition, behavior, and recovery).

3.1 Epidemiological models
Epidemiological models provide a tool to predict how classes of drug
takers behave, and could qualify as a useful framework to assist professionals in
the formulation of treatment and prevention strategies. A model in this family
consists of a system of differential equations describing over time the size of a
subset within the studied population, and is mainly used in the field of
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mathematical epidemiology. As described by Diekmann and Heesterbeek, this
field is
"... about translating biological assumptions into mathematics, about
mathematical analysis aided by interpretation and about obtaining insight
into epidemic phenomena when translating mathematical results back into
population biology" (64,65).

An epidemiological model proposed in 2000 uses three nonlinear
differential equations to describe the dynamics of tobacco use, recovery, and
relapse. This model considers a constant population, divides it into smokers,
potential smokers, and smokers who have quit smoking permanently. It
describes their respective rates of change with respect to time (65,66). More
recently, the introduction of two new classes of mild and chain-smokers, as well
as the impact of smoking-related illnesses, have extended this model. That study
shows how the number of smokers decreases when chain-smokers stay no
longer than 1.5 years in this class before reverting to the mild-smoking class.
Similarly, the number of smokers decreases if mild-smokers stay as such for no
longer than 1.5 years (67). A deeper analysis of the original model reveals four
states of equilibria, only one smoking-free (68).
One of the first epidemiological models of opiate addiction using ordinary
differential equations appeared in 2007 (69). Mathematical epidemiology
principles, more specifically compartmental model structures, were applied in
order to identify the parameters that policy-makers should modulate in order to
maximize the effectiveness of prevention and treatment resources. This study
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concluded that increased drug-use would prevail when the probability of
becoming a heroin user is greater than the sum of the cessation probabilities.
The cessation probabilities describe situations such as treatments, natural or
drug-related deaths, and spontaneous recoveries. To reduce the total number of
heroin users within the population, the probability of becoming an addict is
identified as more significant than the ratio of users accessing treatments. While
assuming that all individuals have the same level of susceptibility, this study
reinforces a foregone conclusion that prevention is better than cure (69). Using
realistic parameters, this model has a stable equilibrium which indicates the
exclusion of an epidemic in heroin use (70). Similar frameworks have been
developed for alcohol addiction (71,72,73).

3.2 Economic models
Conventional economic theory is based upon a fundamental assumption
that an individual acts so as to maximize his/her personal level of satisfaction
with respect to the available resources. The level of satisfaction is called utility,
the available resources are called the budget, and the behavioral phenomenon is
called the utility maximization (74). Economists became interested in drug
addiction by first studying topics related to product consumption and habit
formation.

In

the

standard

model

of

consumption,

exclusively

current

consumption affects utility rather than past and future consumption. More recent
studies consider such temporal component as a fundamental element in
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decision-making processes, which is labeled temporal discounting (75). The
reward, or utility, of an action was initially described as a time-dependent
exponentially decaying function. This expansion originated the current categories
of economic models for addictive behavior, which include the myopic (or
irrational), imperfectly rational, and rational models (76).
The myopic model considers that an addicted individual's preferences
change over time as a consequence of past experiences and other factors such
as advertisements (e.g., a drug prevention campaign) and a drug's price. The
imperfectly rational model assumes two competing natures of the individual, one
that will consistently try to quit using the drug, and another that will regularly
encourage drug use. In the context of cigarette smoking, as described by
Chaloupka and Warner,
"... everybody behaves like two people, one who wants clean lungs and
long life and another who adores tobacco" (77).

The rational addiction model proposed by Becker and Murphy in 1988 (78)
is the most popular of the three models, especially for the analysis of cigarette
consumption, where an individual is assumed to consistently plan the
maximization of utility over time, with current consumption influenced by present,
past, and future budget constraints. Under this framework, addiction is
represented as a strong habit (78).
The field of behavioral economics, where conventional economic theory
meets and unites with psychological correlates, is interested in how people
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behave in reality rather than what an idealized "rational" person would do. For
example, in 1999 Bickel et al. (79) empirically showed that the temporal
discounting of real-life nicotine addicts is better approximated by a hyperbolic
function, rather than by a traditional exponential function. In fact, a smoker
discounts cigarettes more rapidly than financial rewards and, unexpectedly, a
non-smoker and an ex-smoker have similar discount rates for monetary rewards
(79).
More recently, the integration of behavioral economics together with
correlates of neuroscience originated the field of neuroeconomics. In 2005,
Bechara suggested that addiction is
"... the product of an imbalance between two separate, but interacting,
neural systems that control decision making: an impulsive, amygdala
system for signaling pain or pleasure of immediate prospects, and a
reflective, prefrontal cortex system for signaling pain or pleasure of future
prospects" (80).

According to this view, denoted as the "competing brain regions
hypothesis" (75), the consumption of an addictive drug induces an increase in the
activity of the impulsive system and a decrease in the activity of the reflective
system. The addict's temporal discounting of the addictive drug and, as a
consequence, the addict's substance consumption rate are influenced by the
interaction of these systems (75).
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3.3 Quantitative pharmacological models
Pharmacological models of drug addiction consist of a pharmacokinetic
(PK) unit and a pharmacodynamic (PD) unit. PK/PD models are mainly applied to
cocaine self-administration. As expressed by Holford and Sheiner, the first
component characterizes "what the body does to the drug", whereas the latter
component delineates "what the drug does to the body" (81). The PK component
is relevant when the relationships between the drug's concentration and effects
are known, whereas the PD component is pertinent for a constant concentration
of the drug since it does not consider the temporal factor within the
concentration-effects relationships (82). More specifically:
•

The PK module delineates the evolution of drug concentrations in
the brain over time using an open model6 composed of a central or
blood compartment and a peripheral or brain compartment (83);

•

The PD component describes the facilitation of the reward system's
gain using the inhibitory maximal effect (Emax) model which
describes the drug's effects in terms of the it's concentration (84).

One of the earliest quantitative pharmacological models of cocaine selfadministration, presented in 1999, predicts the PK and PD of drug selfadministration in rats (85). The main conclusion of this study concerned how rats
cease cocaine use when the substance concentration is maintained above the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6

In a PK/PD open model the animal's body is considered as a unique homogeneous agent which
absorbs the substance instantaneously and eliminates it as time passes.
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satiety threshold. In particular, a rat will no longer undergo cocaine selfadministration when its inner drug concentration is at a certain level (86).
A more recent PK/PD model from 2000 also incorporated the theory of
receptors dating from the early 1900s (87). This model describes the pertinent
endogenous chemical signaling, more specifically, the receptor pharmacology
and the timing properties characterizing them (88).
A more comprehensive quantitative model of cocaine self-administration
further developed the allostatic framework, discussed in Chapter 2, by proposing
a PK/PD model that accounts for the correlation between compulsive drug intake
and a chronically deviated baseline reward threshold in laboratory rats (37).
Simulations based upon this framework successfully replicate patterns of
intravenous cocaine self-administration observed in laboratory rats. More details
of this PK/PD model, presented by Ahmed and Koob in 2005 (37), are discussed
in Chapter 6.

3.4 Abstract models of dopamine functions
Dopaminergic models of addiction are derived from the artificial
intelligence paradigm, presented by Sutton and Barto (89), known as temporal
difference reinforcement learning (TDRL). The main objective with this family of
models is to characterize the functioning of dopamine in the brain.
The TDRL framework (89), inspired by behavioral psychology, aids an
artificial agent in learning to maximize a numerical reward signal in a given
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environment. The temporal difference component drives the learning process of
the agent by relying on the difference of consecutive predictions of reward related
to the agent's environment (90). In such models, an autonomous intelligent agent
learns from experience how to select actions in order to maximize future rewards.
The agent's decision-making process for action selection is based upon the
strength of the predicted future reward discounted by the expected time to the
reward (89,90).
In 1986, Schultz (91) recorded the activation of dopaminergic neurons of a
monkey in three different settings: (i) the animal is not trained and is provided
with an unexpected reward; (ii) the animal is trained to receive a reward after a
previously activated cue (e.g., visual or auditory stimulus); and (iii) the trained
animal is presented with the activation cue but receives no reward. Barto (92)
and Houk et al. (93) proposed in 1995 a model based on TDRL in which
dopamine encodes prediction errors. In particular, the experimental results of
Schultz (91) demonstrated that: (i) dopaminergic neurons strongly activate when
the monkey receives an unexpected reward; (ii) when the primate has learned
that a visual or auditory cue is precursor of an upcoming reward, dopaminergic
neurons fire when the cue is presented to the animal instead of when the reward
is received; and (iii) the dopaminergic neurons of a trained animal presented with
the learned cue are inactive when the expected reward becomes available.
Barto (92) and Houk et al. (93) presented the first instance of this model's
class in terms of a particular TDRL architecture, called the Actor-Critic
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architecture, to computationally describe dopaminergic neurons in the basal
ganglia. The Actor-Critic framework relates to an agent composed by two
components: the Actor, which controls the agent's actions in relation to its
environment; and the Critic, which provides the Actor with evaluative feedback
about the undertaken actions (92). In 1996-97, Montague et al. (94) and Schultz
et al. (95) also proposed a computational model where dopamine acts as a
"predictive reward signal" (96), while using a slightly different TDRL architecture
than the one previously proposed by Barto (92).
The investigations presented in (92,93) and (95) emphasize how the firing
rates of dopamine neurons in the midbrain mimic the error term of the TDRL
framework. The TD error notifies the computational agent about the difference
between the expected and the actual reward. These studies suggest that the
phasic activity of dopaminergic neurons within the animal's neural substrate code
the internal representation of the monkey's reward prediction errors. A predicted
reward that has a higher or lower value than expected drives the policy revision
of the agent. This, in turn, translates to the monkey thereby changing the strategy
for the next actions.
In 2004, Redish presented a computational model of cocaine addiction
based on a modified TDRL framework (97). The effects of the substance are
simulated by a synthetic positive signal that relates to the dopamine increase
experienced by the subject after a drug intake. The introduction of such synthetic
signal as part of the TD error function prevents the predicted and actual rewards
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from being equal, and therefore precludes the agent from learning a policy other
than taking the drug. In other words, this model just eliminates negative
prediction errors. In such context, addiction is described as a monotonic process
which prevents recovery. Experimental results published in 2007 by Panlilio et al.
(98) refute Redish's hypothesis that each drug intake leads to a reward larger
than the expected reward for that intake.
A subsequent study by Dezfouli et al. (99) reports in 2009 a TDRL
framework which employs an average reward algorithm (100) and does not
consider addiction as a monotonic process towards drug use. The unlearning of
seeking behavior is tackled, but the model cannot describe reinstatement.7 As
pointed out by the authors, the model's validation through experimental data
remains difficult because of its theoretical nature.

3.5 Knowledge repository models
The top-down approaches of the epidemiological and economic models
and the bottom-up approaches of the pharmacological and dopaminergic models
are not, by themselves, sufficient to create a computational framework which
comprehensively describes the addiction process. The former relies on psychosocial factors that affect the addictive behavior of a population, whereas the latter
focus on physiological and neurological evidence to understand the process of
addiction. The common interest of both approaches is to understand animal
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7

Reinstatement may be the homolog of the human experience of relapse.
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behavior (human, primate, or rodent) related to substance use and abuse. A new
family of biologically plausible models has recently emerged, named knowledge
repository (KR) models, which attempts to describe drug addiction as
comprehensively as possible (101).
Bobashev et al. (101) first expressed this view in their summary of the
2006 College on Problems of Drug Dependence workshop. The objective of a KR
model is to amalgamate findings obtained from investigations that focus on
different scales of observation to advance a comprehensive understanding of
substance addiction. The exemplification of a KR model of addiction described by
the authors embraces a wide variety of different factors (e.g., socioeconomic
components, interpersonal relationships, life-changing events, presence of
chronic diseases, physiological and cognitive features, etc.) which may be
correlated in order to simulate plausible behavioral trajectories that illustrate
archetypal patterns of drug use and misuse (e.g., initiation and escalation of drug
use, recovery, relapse, etc.). The principal characteristic of a KR model resides in
the consideration of a multi-scale standpoint that corresponds to a conceptual
framework that is increasingly supported by the scientific community studying
addiction (60,102).
In 2006, Gutkin et al. (103) present the first KR model for nicotine
addiction, which describes the acquisition and maintenance of drug-taking
behavior by means of two modules: one that characterizes action-selection, and
another that describes the signaling of receptors of dopaminergic neurons. The
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major hypothesis is that dopaminergic neurons of the ventral tegmental area
(VTA) are affected by nicotine, which initiates molecular changes in the
glutamate-based learning process within the dorsal striatum. In other words,
nicotine in the VTA acts as a multiplier of the dopaminergic neural signaling that
evaluates a reward related to substance intake. This evaluation modulates the
synaptic plasticity in the dorsal striatum area through glutamate neurons modeled
as a stochastic winner-take-all network which regulates the actual action of
nicotine self-administration. This investigation also integrates a dopaminedependent learning rule differentiating between phasic and tonic dopamine
neurotransmissions (103).
With respect to the abstract models of dopamine functions discussed in
Section 3.4, this KR model is relatively similar in terms of neural correlates that
are modeled, but differs in the computational tools used to describe the system.
Abstract models of dopamine function deploy the computational paradigm of
TDRL where the correspondences between mathematical parameters and
biological means are not always recognized. Instead, KR models as the one
discussed above use ad hoc dynamical systems, where the biological processes
of interest are translated into mathematical language.
The KR model of Gutkin et al. (103) was later discussed in terms of how
nicotine and the neurotransmitter acetylcholine impact the addictive process by
combining the neural dynamics of the VTA with the activities of specific nicotinic
ACh receptor subtypes (104). This investigation suggested furthering the
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exploration of nicotinic acetylcholine receptor mechanisms that are influenced by
nicotine and, in turn, alter the dynamic properties of the reward neural circuitry
(104).
In terms of the scales of observation presented in Figure 1, and as shown
in Figure 3, the KR model for nicotine addiction discussed above (103) includes
neuropsychological and behavioral elements (63). The former layer takes into
account how dopaminergic signals from the ventral pathway influence the
glutamatergic learning processes in the dorsal striatal structures of the brain
(103) and combines the neural dynamics of the VTA with the activities of specific
nicotinic ACh receptor subtypes (104). The latter layer is a stochastic function
contingent on the neural activity of the considered brain areas (103).
The multi-layer approach of KR models may provide pertinent insight for
the interdisciplinary study of addiction. Health care professionals, sociologists,
psychologists, pharmacologists, physiologists, etc. can use such models to
computationally evaluate new hypotheses based on their own expertise, while
taking into account state-of-the-art knowledge from other domains.
In 2008, a review relying on a system biology perspective emphasized the
possible impact that formal frameworks might provide to the study of mental
disorders (61). This survey discussed how the relationship between empirical
and formal methods could be enhanced; presented modeling approaches that
should be considered; reviewed software that may ease formal translations;
identified signal pathways within the neural and molecular scales; and concluded
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that a better understanding of mental disorders linking the molecular level to the
whole system may be achieved by adopting a formal standpoint.
In 2009, the same venue published a review by Tretter et al. (102)
discussing from a systems biology standpoint the onset of addiction while
considering three scales of observations: behavior, the brain's networks
connectivity, and molecules inside the brain's cells. The authors formally
assessed these distinct levels by providing biological architectures of their
structures and exploratory mathematical formulations of their dynamics.
Moreover, the authors proposed a skeleton for a qualitative view of the brain to
include these three scales of observations and predict drug consumption
patterns.

3.6 Relations to the model advanced in this dissertation
This section describes how the computational model at the center of this
dissertation relates to the five categories of models shown in Figure 3 and
discussed in the present chapter.
Epidemiological models. Epidemiological models are more pertinent to
the field of Public Heath than the KR model presented in this dissertation, and
they can be helpful in making decisions about regulations related to drug use and
abuse (e.g., laws, taxes, etc.). These models aim to describe how addiction
spreads within a population, whereas the model presented in this dissertation is
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intended to describe the processes that drive an individual to abuse an addictive
substance.
A significant difference between these two types of modes resides in the
characterization of an individual. Epidemiological models generally assume
uniform drug vulnerability within the population, whereas the computational
model presented in this dissertation includes a large number of parameters which
can describe a large variety of virtual subjects. This difference underlies the
broad conclusions of the studies discussed in Section 3.1 (e.g., prevention is
better than cure).
Epidemiological models consider two of the four scales of observations
encompassed in the KR model presented in this dissertation: the behavioral and
the recovery scales.
Economic models. Conventional economic models of addiction treat drug
consumption as a rational or irrational behavior, and provide important insight
into how price, opportunity cost, and income influence substance abuse. These
models mainly consider that an addict's aim is to maximize hedonic reward.
The main difference between these models and the model at the center of
this dissertation relates to economic factors. In the model presented here they
are not explicitly taken into consideration but instead they are more broadly
considered by means of a process describing influences that social rules have on
individual behavior.
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Conventional economic models consider two of the four scales of
observations considered in the KR model discussed in this dissertation:
behavioral and cognitive. Recently, the neuroeconomics community started to
join conventional economics and abstract models of dopamine functions in order
to better understand decision-making processes. This will eventually enhance
economic models with a neuropsychological and a recovery scale.
Quantitative pharmacological models. PK/PD models arise from the
field of clinical pharmacology and aim to understand the effects of a drug with
respect of specific dosing regimens. This family of models is centered on the
cellular level of an organism. As such, PD/PK models describe how different
concentrations of a pharmaceutical drug influences an organism.
The main contribution of this dissertation is based on the connection of a
KR and a PK/PD model of addiction. In particular, the computational hypothesis
for allostasis presented in Chapter 6 is crafted by integrating the multiscale model
of addiction discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, together with the PK/PD animal
model of addiction presented by Ahmed and Koob (37). The study presented in
Chapter 6 connects a KR and a pharmacological model of addiction, while
providing testable hypotheses about how to increase the success rates of current
addiction treatments in humans.
Pharmacological models of drug addiction generally consider two of the
four scales of observations included in the model advanced in this dissertation:
neuropsychology and cognition.
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Abstract models of dopamine functions. The family of abstract
dopamine models is valuable for proposing testable hypotheses about
dopaminergic structures and functions within the brain. Dopaminergic models use
practical implementations of the TDRL paradigm to match experimental
observations related to dopamine.
The main challenge for these models is to create a connection between
computational theory and real brain systems. In particular, TDRL frameworks are
used to describe dopaminergic functions in the animal brain, but some of the
involved computational parameters still require a clear correspondence with real
brain correlates. Moreover, these models are exclusively based on the
neurotransmitter dopamine, which has a significant role in the process of
addiction but is not the only involved compound.
The KR model discussed in this dissertation takes into account the
influence of dopamine in the process of addiction, while integrating additional
factors which are significant for a more comprehensive understanding of this
disease. The KR model discussed herein does not include a TDRL apparatus.
Nonetheless, a possible location where the discussed KR model can be united
with dopaminergic models is indicated in Chapter 6.
Abstract models of dopamine functions encompass two of the four scales
of observations considered in the KR model discussed in this dissertation:
neuropsychology and recovery. As mentioned earlier, recent neuroeconomics
studies combine dopaminergic models with conventional economic models, and
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will eventually enhance dopaminergic models with a behavioral and cognitive
scale.
Knowledge repository models. The model at the center of this
dissertation is a KR model aiming to describe drug use and abuse by integrating
within the same formal framework multiple layers of observations. With respect to
the foundational KR model by Gutkin et al. (103), which includes studies of
neuropsychology and behavior, the model presented in this dissertation
encompasses the four scales of observations discussed in Chapter 1, namely:
neuropsychological, cognitive, behavioral, and recovery scales.
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CHAPTER 4
FIVE-STEPS TOWARD A COMPUTATIONAL MODEL

The formal framework advanced in this dissertation is, in terms of
Bobashev et al. (101), a knowledge repository (KR) model of addiction. The
proposed computational framework integrates into a unique apparatus four
different scales of observations to provide a more comprehensive view of drug
addiction, as illustrated in Figure 4. The neuropsychological scale relies on
quantitative studies of neural processes involved in addiction; the cognitive scale
is a computational hypothesis whose rationale is endorsed by experimental
findings; and the behavioral scale relies on quantitative observations about
neural development, on established theories about addiction, and on the possible
impact that social rules may have on addictive behaviors. The recovery scale is a
biological speculation that may be supported by the empirical observations
discussed in Chapter 1, known as maturing out of addiction (22) or as natural
recoveries (105,20), which are remission instances from abusive drug
consumption that occur without any behavioral or pharmacological interventions
and that are so far unexplained.
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Figure 4: The knowledge repository (KR) model presented in this dissertation takes into account
the four scales of observations, namely neuropsychology, cognition, behavior, and recovery.

In terms of modeling and simulation theory, these four scales of
observations outline the experimental frame of the model. Zeigler et al. (33)
define the experimental frame as a collection of data of interest and against
which model validity will be examined.
The computational model advanced in this dissertation intends to describe
drug addiction as the aggregate of the relevant collection of data outlined by
Levy5 and Siegelmann (27), and elaborated by Levy et al. (29,32,38): neural
activities resulting from drug use; the mediation of mental processes converting
these activities into decision-making; the related sociocultural and educational
influences; and the intervention of rehabilitative means.
This chapter outlines the five steps undertaken with the objective of
providing a simulator capable of predicting archetypal instances of observations
contained in the experimental frame. The five steps are formalization,
demonstration of expandability, qualitative validation, analysis of dynamics, and
sensitivity analysis. This formal course of action results in a framework
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appropriate for the comprehensive study of addiction aiming to encourage
hypothesis-driven research. Within this line of research, in Chapter 5 is
presented an exploratory hypothesis relating the brain's cognitive mechanisms to
natural recoveries. Furthermore, and aiming to support translational research for
drug addiction, in Chapter 6 are studied the connections between the allostatic
theory of addiction (presented in Chapter 2) and current practices of
rehabilitation.

4.1 Formalization of the biology underlying addiction
This initial step includes the creation of the conceptual diagram describing
the model, the development of mathematical definitions characterizing it, and
their implementation within a computational framework.
The formalization phase is intended to present the system architecture
with the relevant processes classified according to four scales of observation:
neuropsychology, cognition, behavior, and recovery. This step facilitates the
initiation of the mathematical definitions of the model's processes and their
implementation within a computational framework, while easing communication
among the multidisciplinary community for which this research is intended.
In the natural world, the processes subject to modeling operate in
continuous time. During the formalization phase these natural processes are
each mathematically approximated by discrete time functions, such as functions
of a discrete variable geometrically increasing or decreasing; functions of a
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discrete variable with decreasing values throughout activation. These functions
are defined largely through weighted sums and sigmoid functions. These
mathematical definitions are crafted to restrain the model's parameter search
space while allowing a large diversity of dynamics to arise. In addition, parameter
values are constrained to biological data to the extent possible.
During the formalization process, a basic learning rule inspired by the
weights adaptation of a perceptron was proposed and demonstrated to be a
necessary condition for making this framework effective in the emulation of a
recovery process. These learning rules and demonstrations are discussed in
Chapter 5 and in (32).
A KR model of addiction was established which includes four scales of
observation. The outcomes of the formalization phase are detailed in (28,30); in
Chapters 5 and 6 of this dissertation, which include conceptual diagrams; and in
Appendix A, which includes mathematical definitions.

4.2 Demonstration of expandability
Expandability is an important feature of a model if its plausibility is to be
improved over time. Practically any biological entity can be observed at different
scales of observation. For example, the study of an organism's nervous system
includes granularities ranging from units of angstrom to meter (30). Any level of
observation is potentially a pertinent source of knowledge towards a more
accurate description of the studied system. Moreover, expandability is a suitable
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property for a computational model prepared to include new scientific insights
without compromising the whole framework underlying the model.
Hypothesis: the presented KR computational model of addiction is
expandable in terms of the levels of observation defining it.
Levy5 and Siegelmann (27) considered as constant two main processes of
their model: inhibition and compulsion. To strengthen the model's rationale, the
present model extends these constant signals into dynamical processes. The
inhibition process is defined to include social and developmental factors, and the
compulsion process is designed to mimic the incentive-sensitization theory of
addiction.
This contribution demonstrates the model's expandability in terms of its
levels of observations and further incorporates additional biological details. The
evaluation of this expansion is immediate: on the one hand, the non-monotonic
and relapse properties of the systems are preserved; on the other hand, these
expansions allow characterizing virtual subjects of different ages and living in
various environments. This expansion was presented by Levy et al. (29).
An additional demonstration of expansion is presented in (38) and in
Chapter 6, where the integration of a pharmacokinetic/pharmacodynamic module
into the model increases its scope without compromising the framework.
The hypothesis of the model's expandability was demonstrated. The
discussed model's elaborations augment the computational description of
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addiction toward a more comprehensive portrayal, while verifying that pre- and
post- expansion outcomes are consistent with each other.

4.3 Qualitative validation
As described by Zeigler et al. (33), the validation step requires a significant
correspondence between experimental data and computational simulations.
Usually, a computational model of a biological system is designed to mimic a
specific set of data that are measured in a particular experimental frame.
The computational model at the center of this dissertation relies on
qualitative descriptions of processes defining addiction. These descriptions are
grounded on animal studies, human observations, or even common sense. A
classical quantitative validation is not suitable because the model is meant to
mimic behavioral trajectories of a virtual human subject by integrating a multitude
of features characterizing addictive drug use and abuse rather than, for example,
to precisely correlate firing frequencies and responsiveness of neurons within a
particular area of a particular brain.
Qualitative processes included in the discussed model include the level of
negative consequences (or pain), the negative emotional state (or stress), current
craving for the drug, the saliency of drug cues, as well as several external
triggers such as sudden traumas, strong stressful events, drug priming, and
acute cues (106), which details are presented by Levy et al. (29,32,38).
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Hypothesis: the KR model of addiction presented in this investigation is
qualitatively valid for a useful range of human behaviors.

Within this context, the validation of the present model relies on qualitative
and rational arguments which emphasize the model's ability to mimic real-life
patterns of behavior related to substance use and abuse. Preliminary qualitative
validations were presented in (29,30) while considering limited drug consumption
and relapse. Simulations of archetypal behavioral patterns of drug consumption
such as escalation of drug use; conventional treatments (e.g., nicotine patches
for smoking); and alternative medical cures (e.g., meditation) are discussed in
Chapters 5 and 6 of this dissertation, and presented in (32,38).
The validity hypothesis is problematic to prove because of the highdimensionality of the computational model and its large number of parameters.
The simulations provided in Chapters 5 and 6 account for a demonstration of
validity by providing appropriate simulations for representative behavioral
patterns defined within the system's experimental framework.
Qualitative validation of the KR model at the center of this dissertation was
demonstrated to the extent possible.

4.4 Dynamical properties analysis
The computational model at the center of this investigation considers
addiction as a non-monotonic disease. In other words, the addictive state of a
virtual subject described by the model is assumed to be a reversible process. In
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terms of dynamical system, this assumption considers the existence of an
addictive state able to evolve into a healthy state as a consequence of a slight
perturbation of the system. More specifically, the addictive state described by the
model should not be an attractor. A dynamical system analysis of the model's
output could reveal otherwise.
Hypothesis: the KR model of addiction presented in this investigation is
able to describe non-monotonic cases of addiction.

In the analysis conducted in (30), no steady states were found in
simulations related to behavioral patterns of drug consumption. Also no evidence
was found which attests to the existence of fixed points in the trajectory of the
model's output.
A deeper analysis of these simulations suggests that the processes
defining the neuropsychological scale of the model do not prevent the addicted
virtual subject from regaining a healthy behavioral state. These analyses
demonstrate that a less-healthy virtual subject (i.e., an agent more likely to
consume drugs) expresses fewer fluctuations and less flexibility in drug-seeking
behavior than a more-healthy virtual subject (i.e., an agent less prone to drug
intake). The dynamical analysis step presented in (30) supports the possibility of
a computational intervention that simulates rehabilitation, as discussed by
Siegelmann et al. (28), and by Levy et al. (32,107).
The proposed KR model of addiction was shown to be able to describe
non-monotonic cases of addiction.
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4.5 Sensitivity analysis
During the framework's formalization step, the mathematical definitions of
the processes were crafted to minimize the number of parameters, while allowing
the simulation to mimic a variety of behavioral profiles. Nevertheless, the number
of the model's parameters is large. Many of these parameters arise from
mathematical constraints rather than from natural observations. The effect of
such parameter on the model's output should be analyzed in order to avoid the
framework's corruption.
Sensitivity analysis was applied to identify such possible parameters. A
suitable technique was found in a one-factor-at-a-time (OAT) analysis, where all
the parameters are methodically examined for different values to understand how
they affect the model's output (108). A classical OAT approach necessitates
systematically testing one parameter against the others. Given the large number
of parameters employed in the model's formal description, such approach would
have consumed excessive resources. Aiming to optimize resources while taking
advantage of the classical OAT procedure, the model's mathematical features
were examined with respect to the natural processes they are meant to describe.
For example, the parameters defining the geometrically increasing or decreasing
processes within the model are intended to describe real-life features which have
different rates of change for different nonfictional subjects. Because these
functions are bounded, the values of their parameters are not undermining the
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framework's dynamics toward a particular outcome. In other words, and as
shown in Figure 5 and detailed in (31), the framework's structure was analyzed
while simultaneously considering both the phenomenological and mathematical
properties of the model, to identify possible sources of destabilization. Such
structural analysis recognized one potentially problematic parameter, which may
bias the virtual subject toward an unchanging behavioral trajectory: to always or
to never consume the substance.
To avoid this bias, a safe set of possible values for this potentially
problematic parameter was proposed in form of a function dependent upon other
pertinent parameters of the model. To test such functional control, several
simulations were undertaken with different values of this potentially problematic
parameter, and the corresponding outputs were analyzed (31).

Figure 5: Prior to execution, the model's phenomenological and mathematical inter-correlations
were analyzed, and when necessary a functional control was crafted and refined by analysis of
the model's output. Modified from (31).
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In more detail, the majority of processes within the neuropsychological and
behavioral scales of the model are exponential functions that are explicitly
restricted to remain within a bounded interval (e.g., [0,1]) and include a number of
parameters defining their rates of change. These processes are not inclined to
destabilize the framework's output even though increasing or decreasing at
different paces.
A hyperbolic tangent function is used within the cognitive scale to scale a
process into a specific interval (e.g., [–1,1]). This hyperbolic tangent includes a
parameter which is a mathematical requisite rather than a biologically inspired
component. Algebraic analysis of this particular parameter shows that, under
defined conditions, the virtual subject's state could become biased toward a
consistent drug consumption or abstinence. This issue was discussed in (31),
where it was shown that the introduction of a functional control can limit the
model's bias toward a particular behavior of the virtual subject.
The objective of identificating sensible parameter values was attained, and
the possible control for such parameter values was demonstrated. The details of
the sensitivity analysis are presented by Levy et al. (31).

4.6 Concluding remarks
The five-step procedure described in the present chapter generates a
computational framework whose features may be pertinent to hypothesis-driven
research about substance use and abuse. The computational definitions of the
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processes composing the model are reported in Appendix A of this dissertation.
The biological descriptions of these processes are reported in (29,32,38) and in
Chapters 5 and 6 of this dissertation.
In particular, Chapter 5 presents a computational speculation about
maturing out of addiction, whereas Chapter 6 provides plausible insight about
addiction by further elaborating the model to include two theories discussed in
Chapter 2: the allostatic model and the impaired response inhibition and salience
attribution model.
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CHAPTER 5
HYPOTHESIS-DRIVEN FRAMEWORK FOR MATURING OUT

The computational model resulting from the five-step procedure discussed
in Chapter 4 is presented and deployed in this chapter. The aim of this
contribution is to provide a theoretical and biologically plausible computational
description for the unexplained phenomenon of maturing out of addiction (22).

Most of this chapter reports the investigation discussed in (32).

5.1 A Multiscale Model of Addiction
In this chapter, a systemic model is advanced, as shown in Figure 6,
which aims to characterize the comportment of a human through its tendency
toward drug-seeking behavior. This computational framework was defined and
qualitatively validated (29), its dynamics and sensitivity were analyzed (30,31),
and its recovery scale initiated (28).
The model shown in Figure 6 comprises neuropsychological, recovery,
cognitive, and behavioral elements. The neuropsychological scale incorporates
internal and external processes describing the neural ongoing activity that
depends on time t (in hours). Internal processes include the level of negative
consequences such as poor health or social relations, P(t), the level of negative
emotional state, S(t), the level of drug craving, D(t), and the saliency of drug-
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associated cues, Q(t). The external processes characterize sudden experiences
that, when activated, instantly influence the subject's neural activity. These are:
drug-associated cues, AQ(t), that may be triggered by an event such as visiting a
drug buddy; painful traumas, AP(t), that may cause an addict to stop taking drugs
immediately for a period of time; strong stressful episodes, AS(t), that may lead a
former addict into immediate drug-use; and drug priming, AD(t), such as social
drinking, that may bring the virtual subject into drug-use again. The output of the
model, G(t), depends on both internal and external processes. The process G(t)
defines a feedback loop to the neuropsychological scale. The behavioral scale
includes the model's output G(t), which is a qualitative evaluation of a virtual
subject's tendency for drug-seeking, and arises from the antagonism between
inhibitory and compulsory elements. Negative values of G(t) correspond to
maladaptive behavior, whereas positive ones account for healthy behavior. For
the sake of clarity, the processes of inhibition and compulsion are considered
constants even though explicit time dependencies of these processes were
previously defined (29).
The cognitive scale complies with the definition by Bourgine and Stewart:
"A system is cognitive if and only if sensory inputs serve to trigger actions
in a specific way, so as to satisfy a viability constraint" (109).

This scale is established as a mediator between low and high level of
behavioral control. In a perceptron-like architecture, the neuropsychological
processes are weighted and integrated to define the degree of rationality, rd(t),
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which drives the virtual subject's cognitive state, cs(t), toward a more inhibited or
a more compulsive behavior. The recovery scale is a computational hypothesis
which relies on the definition of natural recovery, for which the addict ceases
using the drug "without the help of treatment intervention" (105), suggesting a
recovery process solely impacting the cognitive scale (no pharmacological or
behavioral interventions). The recovery process is designated as a sudden
cognitive change which, when induced, makes achievable a drug abstinence
period that may or may not endure. The recovery scale affects the virtual
subject's cognitive state by two mechanisms: a direct intervention on the virtual
subject's rationality estimation, and a modulation of the internal and external
processes weights. The second mechanism can endure and aims to emulate
cognitive learning (i.e., the neural plasticity in the prefrontal cortex). In the next
section are presented the formal descriptions of the cognitive and recovery
scales. Computational definitions of the neuropsychological and behavioral
scales are reported in (29) and in Appendix A.
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Figure 6: Diagram of the computational model, where the output of the model G(t) represents the tendency for drug-seeking behavior. The levels
of observations represented include the neuropsychological scale in green, the recovery scale in orange, the cognitive scale in red, and the
behavioral scale in blue.
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5.2 Methods
This section presents the details of the cognitive and recovery scales, as
well as the data used to emulate instances of the recovery process.
The rationality density, rd(t), is defined as a weighted sum of the
neuropsychological and recovery processes:

ω S (t)⋅ S(t) + ω P (t)⋅ P(t) + ω D (t)⋅ D(t) +

rd(t) =

+ω AS ⋅ AS (t) + ω AP ⋅ AP (t) + ω AD ⋅ AD (t) +

Eq. 1

+Q(t)⋅ AQ (t) + ω h ⋅ h(t).

+

The weights ω for the processes P(t) and AP(t) are in ! , whereas the
−

other weights are in ! . This rationality estimate drives the cognitive state of the
virtual subject, cs(t):
1
1
cs(t) = tanh (α ⋅ cs(t −1) + β ⋅ rd(t) + γ ) + ,
2
2

Eq. 2

where of α, β, and γ are constants and the model's sensitivity to their values is
discussed in (31).
The recovery process, h(t), equals 1 if it is active, and 0 otherwise. The
active state of the recovery process is determined by trigger events that occur at
any time step t with a probability that depends on the subject's age, together with
a duration process that determines the active state's duration once triggered.
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Letting te(t) indicate the presence or absence of a trigger event at time step t (in
hours):
 1 with probability p(T )
te(t) = 
otherwise,
 0

Eq. 3

where p(T ) depends on the subject's age T (in years) according to Equation 8 that
is a smooth fit to the discrete data in Table 1.
The duration process, d(t), accumulates trigger events by being increased
by a positive constant, δ, whenever there is a trigger event, i.e., whenever te(t) =
1, and otherwise being decremented by 1 but bounded below by 0:


δ ⋅ d(t)
if te(t) = 1
d(t +1) = 
 max ( 0, d(t) −1) otherwise.

Eq. 4

Given this, the recovery process is active whenever d(t) is non-zero:

 1 if d(t) > 0
h(t) = 
 0 otherwise.

Eq. 5

The effect of this is that if one assumes that at initial time t0, d(t0) = 0, then
the recovery process becomes active upon the first occurrence of a trigger event
and remains active for δ time steps after that, unless other trigger events occur
while it is active, in which case the duration is increased by δ for each trigger
event.8

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8

The author thanks A. G. Barto for his help with this formal description.
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When a recovery process arises, it influences rd(t) through two
mechanisms. On the one hand, h(t) has a direct effect on rd(t) as defined in
Equation 1. On the other hand, the cognitive weights ω of the processes P(t), S(t),
and D(t) provisionally change their values according to the relationship:
 κ + ∆ if h(t) = 1
ω (t) = 
otherwise,
 κ

Eq. 6

+

−

where ∆ is in ! for S(t) and D(t), and in ! for P(t).
At the last active time step of a recovery process, h(t), the temporary effect
on ω of processes P(t), S(t), and D(t) can become permanent with arbitrary
probability θ (different for the three processes):

 κ + ∆ if d(t) = 1 and with probability θ
κ (t) = 
otherwise.
 κ

Eq. 7

This equation aims to mimic neural plasticity within the cognitive cortex of
the virtual subject and is referred to as cognitive learning.

5.2.1 Probability of a recovery process P(T )
In 1962, Charles Winick popularized the phenomenon of maturing out of
narcotics addiction, revealing cases where regular heroin and synthetic opiate
abusers

ceased

using

the

substance

without

any

psychological

or

pharmacological treatment (22). In 1980, Maddux and Desmond discussed the
possible overestimation of Winik's statistics, and proposed further data to
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increase the accuracy of the study (24). Maddux and Desmond confirmed that
the trends of age distribution for withdrawal initiations were consistent in both
studies, and argued the possible overestimation due to the disregard of cessation
onset rates in the base addict population.
In the present investigation, data reported in (22) and (24) are combined to
quantify the likelihood of a narcotic addict to undergo a maturing out experience.
Winick based his investigation on the number of addicts reported to the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics in 1955 that were not reported again during a five-year
period (22). As reported in Table 1, the probability for an addict to experience a
maturing out experience is inferred (fourth column in Table 1). This probability is
scaled using the subsequent results by Maddux and Desmond, which report the
annual rates of abstinence onset in the base population (24). For simplification
purposes, the age category "All ages" in (24) is considered to describe the age
range from 0 to 19 years old, and the category "40-49" to additionally include
ages exceeding 49 years old. The scaled cumulative distribution function for a
maturing out event to arise can be approximated in terms of the age in years T of
a virtual subject as:
p(T ) =

0.02359
.
1+ e−0.154⋅T +5.037
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> 40

30-40

20-30

< 20

Age

(39.0%)
2857
(39.5%)
1544
(21.3%)

(53.6%)
14058
(31.0%)
5247
(11.6%)

(0.2%)

(3.8%)
2820

13

1743

24343

FS

AP

!

62.08%

32.65%

12.33%

0.75%

CDF P(FS|AP)

38

22

21

23

AOA

23.59‰

7.18‰

2.59‰

0.17‰

CDF P(FS|AP) * AOA

Table 1: Data about the US narcotics users population in 1955 and the related former addicts population at the end of 1959. These data are used
to calculate the cumulative distribution function (CDF) describing the occurrences of maturing out from narcotics addiction, which is subsequently
scaled in accordance to new observations about the onset age of abstinence in the base population. AP = Number of active addicts in total addict
population; FS = Number of former addicts in sample; AOA = Annual onsets of abstinence per 1000. Columns AP, FS, and AOA are reproduced
from (22,24) with permission of the United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
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5.3 Results: plausible scenarios of drug-seeking and maturing out
Two scenarios are presented of a virtual subject denoted as B.T, who had
a healthy mental and physical development and became an addict in her early
adulthood. In the first set of simulations, the weights ω of the processes P(t), S(t),
and D(t) can only change their values according to Equation 6, whereas in the
second set of simulations Equation 7 also applies. The graphs reported in this
section represent the mean of 100 simulations of 600 time steps (~25 days) each
and their corresponding standard errors of the mean for B.T. at the age of 35.

5.3.1 Baseline simulations
The baseline scenario is presented in Figure 7, where the computed
profile of B.T.'s drug seeking-behavior, G(t), is not influenced either from the
direct or from the indirect effects of the recovery process. In these situations, the
model's output G(t) is steady at negative values, corresponding to maladaptive
behavior. The internal processes have stable trajectories, and only the external
processes AP(t) and AQ(t) occur, since AS(t) and AD(t) can not be triggered when
G(t) is negative.
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5.3.2 Direct Influence of the Recovery Process
According to Equation 8, a 35 year old virtual subject can be exposed to at
most 5 recovery processes within the year. In more details, p(35) = 0.0144 which
corresponds to 5.27 expected recovery events within 365 days. Figure 8 shows
the graphs corresponding to the processes defining B.T.'s profile. The recovery
process h(t) has a direct effect solely on her cognitive scale. In other words, the
weights ω of the processes P(t), S(t), and D(t), used to estimate the cognitive
state, can only temporarily change their values, during an active process h(t), but
are not subject to any permanent alteration. There are 4 recovery processes that
occur during these simulations, at t ∈ {120, 200, 210, 420}, which correspond to
an immediate and strong change in the model's output G(t). For a limited time,
B.T. expresses healthy behavior because of the new value of the weights ω.
During this period, the model's output G(t) becomes positive, but this sudden
change does not last for a sufficient time for B.T. to acquire a permanent healthy
behavior, and her maladaptive behavior regains predominance when the active
effect of h(t) ceases.

5.3.3 Direct and Potentially Long-Term Influences of the Recovery Process
In the previous scenario, the direct effect of the recovery process by itself
is not durable enough for the whole system to acquire the necessary dynamic
allowing B.T. to start a potentially long-lasting period of abstinence. The nonmonotonic property of this model (30) computationally grants B.T. a possible
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lifelong rehabilitation, but the values of the constants defining the model that are
necessary to achieve such a condition will correspond to a situation beyond
biological plausibility (e.g., an event h(t) lasting several months). In the
simulations presented in Figure 9, the weights ω of the processes P(t), S(t), and
D(t), can permanently change their values once the active effect of h(t) ceases
accordingly to Equation 7. After completing the 3rd recovery process, B.T.
expresses a fragile healthy behavior (positive G(t) values), which is further
consolidated by the 4th recovery process. This simulation exemplifies a plausible
trajectory of an addict that starts an abstinence period within a period of about
one month, as a result of 4 long-lasting recovery events, as for example could
correspond to instances of non-traditional healing techniques to help overcoming
addiction. Instances of these techniques were discussed in the late 1970s (e.g.
meditation, faith healing, holistic medicine, etc.) (110), and more recently were at
the center of two issues of the journal serving the Association for Medical
Education and Research in Substance Abuse (e.g. "attentional control",
Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy, etc.) (111,112).
The simulations presented in Figures 7 and 8 show the contrast between
the progressions of a virtual subject in the absence and in the presence of
recovery events, respectively. In both scenarios, maladaptive behavior persists. It
is only when the virtual subject's cognitive learning is active, as described in
Equation 7, that the virtual subject is able to maintain healthy behavior even after
recovery events dissipate.
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Figure 7: Mean and standard errors of the mean for 100 simulations of B.T.'s profile at 35 years old, 600 time steps long (25 days) without any
effect of h(t). (A) The drug-seeking behavior G(t) is negative (maladaptive behavior). (B) The recovery process h(t) is constantly zero. (C) The
cognitive weights ω(t) are constant. (D) The internal processes S(t), P(t), and D(t) are smooth. (E) The steady internal process Q(t) and the its
related external process AQ(t). (F) The external processes AS(t), AP(t), and AD(t). The processes AS(t) and AD(t) are overlapping (constantly equal to
zero) since can not occur when G(t)<0.
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Figure 8: Mean and standard errors of the mean for 100 simulations of B.T.'s profile at 35 years old, 600 time steps long (25 days) under the
direct effect of h(t). (A) The drug-seeking behavior G(t) is mostly negative (maladaptive behavior) and the effect of the recovery process h(t) is
strong enough to temporarily change it into positive (healthy behavior). (B) The recovery process h(t) is activated at t ∈ {120, 200, 210, 420}. (C)
The cognitive weights ω(t) change value when h(t) is active. (D) The internal processes S(t), P(t), and D(t) change behavior when h(t) is active. (E)
The internal process Q(t) and the its related external process AQ(t) are influenced by h(t). (F) The external processes AS(t), AP(t), and AD(t). The
processes AS(t) and AD(t) occur only when G(t)>0, that in this scenario also corresponds to an active h(t).
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Figure 9: Mean and standard errors of the mean for 100 simulations of B.T.'s profile at 35 years old, 600 time steps long (25 days) under the
effect of h(t). (A) The drug-seeking behavior G(t) starts as negative (maladaptive behavior) and the effect of the recovery process h(t) allows its
transition into positive values (healthy behavior). (B) The recovery process h(t) is activated at t ∈ {120, 200, 210, 420}. (C) The cognitive weights
ω(t) change value when h(t) is active and are subject to a permanent change when an h(t) event becomes inoperative. (D) The internal processes
S(t), P(t), and D(t) change behavior when G(t) transition to positive values. (E) The internal process Q(t) and the its related external process AQ(t)
are influenced by h(t) and the positive value of G(t). (F) The external processes AS(t), AP(t), and AD(t).
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5.4 Analysis: a cognitive learning mechanism to enable maturing out
The parameter γ in Equation 2 significantly influences the output of the
model, and its value can be calculated to mathematically ensure that the virtual
subject has no cognitive preference toward a particular behavior. This is
exemplified in Figure 10 and detailed in (31). In Figure 10 are presented two
identical virtual subjects which differ only by the magnitude of ωP, whose values
are ωP = 0.55 and ωP = 0.75 for Class 1 and Class 2, respectively. In the
simulations presented in Figure 10 there is no recovery process and all weights
are constant throughout the experiments. Three evaluations are presented with
different values of γ, in particular, a profile biased toward maladaptive behavior (γ
= –1.3), a profile biased toward healthy behavior (γ = 3.3), and a profile without
prior cognitive bias (unbiased γ, γ = –0.49375). The evaluations with a biased γ
express considerably less flexibility than the evaluation with the unbiased γ.
The simulations presented in this chapter show that a cognitive learning
mechanism is a necessary but not sufficient condition for recovery: for some
virtual subjects, cognitive interventions are successful in facilitating rehabilitation,
whereas for some others they are not.
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Figure 10: Simulations of a virtual subject having different cognitive inclinations. The profile
biased toward maladaptive behavior has γ = –1.3, the profile biased toward healthy behavior has γ
= 3.3, and the unbiased profile has γ = –0.49375. Classes 1 and 2 represents two virtual subject
which have the same profile with exception the value of ωP, which is ωP = 0.55 and ωP = 0.75,
respectively. Slightly modified from (31).

Comparisons of simulations defined by an arbitrary γ with simulations
using the unbiased γ, defined in (31), are presented in Figure 11. The unbiased γ
ensures that the virtual subject's cognitive scale is able to range over
maladaptive and healthy behaviors without becoming trapped into a particular
state. The value of γ is the same for simulations presented in Figures 7-8, and
the ones in Figure 9 labeled as "B.T.'s original γ". All other parameters are
equivalent for all simulations. In Figure 9 (A and D) there are no recovery
processes h(t); in Figure 11 (B and E) only direct influences of h(t) are
considered; and in Figure 11 (C and F) both Equations 6 and 7 apply. The
baseline simulations presented in Figure 11 (A and D), which do not include any
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recovery occurrences, show the cognitive predilection of B.T. toward a healthier
behavior. B.T.'s original portrayal expresses a less accentuated likelihood of
maladaptive behavior than its correspondent cognitively unbiased description.
The computed behaviors involving solely the direct influence of the recovery
process h(t), compared in Figure 11 (B and E), describe a situation in which B.T.
successfully abstains from drug use for a limited time, but the corresponding
cognitively unbiased profile constantly preserves maladaptive behavior. The
behavioral and neuropsychological characteristics of the subject make this
abstinence difficult to preserve for B.T.'s original profile, and establish a
challenging environment for her unbiased profile to reach a healthy behavior. The
model's outcomes presented in Figure 11 (C and F) compare the original and
unbiased profiles of B.T. when both the direct and the potentially long-term
influences of the recovery process h(t) are active. Both cases tend towards a
healthier behavior, which is reached and maintained by the original profile but is
barely touched by the unbiased profile.
The 2-D cross-correlations shown in Figure 11 D, E, and F provide an
immediate look at the similarity between B.T.'s original profile and its
correspondent cognitively unbiased alter ego, considering each simulation rather
than the mean of several simulations. Without any recovery processes, the crosscorrelation matrix has a smooth circular pattern (Figure 11D), which becomes
distorted when only the local effect of the process h(t) is active (Figure 11E), and
substantially changes the motif for simulations operating the cognitive learning
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described above (Figure 11F). These cross-correlation patterns suggest that the
first and second case studies share a moderately similar dynamic, whereas they
differ with respect to the dynamic of the third case study.
These results suggest that an addict may have the cognitive means to
start an abstinence period which, depending on his or her neural substrate and
natural surroundings, could persist over time.
The juxtaposition of the original and the unbiased profiles demonstrate
that the cognitive learning mechanism discussed in this chapter is a necessary
but not sufficient condition to guarantee recovery. This may provide a biologically
plausible rationale to assist further explorations on how drug abusers respond to
recovery practices including cognitive interventions.

5.5 Concluding Remarks
The fields of psychology and neuroscience provide us with a growing
amount of evidence supporting the fundamental role of cognitive components in
the course of an addict's life. A pivotal investigation demonstrates that cocaine
craving is induced by neural correlates within the frontal cortex, rather than by the
dopaminergic circuitry (113), and in a recent review paper, George and Koob
propose the hypothesis for which
"drug addiction involves a failure of the different subcomponents of the
executive systems controlling key cognitive modules that process reward,
pain, stress, emotion, habits, and decision-making" (114).
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Heeding this belief, and supported by observations of natural recoveries,
the framework presented here aims to describe a simplistic computational
scheme necessary to counteract such cognitive deficiency. Even though the
neural correlates of an addict's limbic system have been modified compared to
the brain of a healthy individual, it seems biologically plausible to consider neural
changes in the prefrontal cortex to account, at least partially, for a balancing
mechanism reconditioning the brain's functions towards a healthy state.
The present investigation proposes formal arguments to support the
hypothesis of a cognitive learning mechanism, defined in Equation 7, capable of
influencing decision-making processes associated with drug abuse. The
emulated abstinence onsets from drug abuse presented above are an initial
attempt toward the localization of such a balancing mechanism. To advance this
exploration, it would be interesting to emulate similar rehabilitation properties
within a more elaborated biologically inspired cognitive architecture, as for
example Leabra (115), Clarion (116), or GMU-BICA (117). To further enhance
psychological plausibility of the model presented in this paper, components
studied in pathological gambling (stressors, cognitive distortions, ruminations,
and distractions) (118) could be incorporated and explored.
The framework presented in this chapter supports the view that
mindfulness-based cognitive techniques can act as a catalyst for maturing out of
addiction.
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Figure 11: Comparison of simulations using the original and the cognitively unbiased values of γ. On the upper part are represented means and
standard errors of the mean of the model's output G(t) for 100 simulations of 600 time steps (25 days) each. On the bottom part are plotted the
cross-correlations matrices comparing B.T.'s original profiles with its unbiased profile. In (A, D) the recovery process h(t) is not active; in (B, E) h(t)
is active but can not induce a permanent change of the cognitive weights; and in (C, F) h(t) is active and can potentially initiate a long-lasting
period of abstinence by permanently modifying the cognitive weights values. In (D, E, F) the cross-correlation gradient progresses from red (high)
to blue (low).
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CHAPTER 6
A COMPUTATIONAL HYPOTHESIS FOR ALLOSTASIS

In the present Chapter, the KR framework supporting the hypothesis for
maturing out discussed in Chapter 5 is modified and expanded to include a
module relating the allostasis theory of addiction, which is based on
pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic characteristics of drug use and abuse.
The objective of this contribution is to provide a theory-based hypothesis that
could be tested experimentally, possibly leading to an improvement in the
understanding of this phenomenon.

This Chapter reports the investigation in (38).

The current investigation was undertaken to explore the allostatic
framework of addiction, described in Chapter 2, by considering two computational
hypotheses in which within-system and between-system adaptations are explicit
time-dependent processes, and to introduce a computational estimation of mood
change related to drug intake in human users. Motivated by animal observations
(119), the within-system adaptations predicted by the presented model depend
upon ongoing neural activities defining the virtual subject's current attitude
towards drug use. Between-system adaptations rely on higher-order cognitive
processes in accordance with the "impaired response inhibition and salience
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attribution" (I-RISA) theory of addiction by Goldstein and Volkow (34), discussed
in Section 2.7. For evaluation and validation purposes, an additional provisional
assumption is formulated to predict the subject's mood as dependent on reward
functions controlling behavior and on euphoric and dysphoric effects of the
consumed substance.

6.1 Introduction
The allostatic theory of drug abuse describes how the brain's reward
system evolves as substance misuse progresses. Neural adaptations arising
from the reward system itself and from the antireward system provide the subject
with functional stability, while affecting the person's mood. The present
investigation proposes a computational hypothesis describing how a virtual
subject's drug consumption, cognitive substrate, and mood interface with reward
and antireward system neuroadaptations. Reward system adaptations are
presumed interrelated with the ongoing neural activity defining behavior towards
drug intake. These adaptations arise from brain areas that encompass the
nucleus accumbens, ventral tegmental area, and prefrontal cortex (PFC).
Antireward system adaptations are assumed to mutually connect with higherorder cognitive processes occurring within PFC, orbitofrontal cortex, and anterior
cingulate cortex. The subject's mood estimation is a provisional function of
reward components.
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A knowledge repository model for allostasis is presented, which
incorporates pharmacokinetic, pharmacodynamic, neuropsychological, cognitive,
and behavioral components. Behavioral patterns of tobacco smoking exemplify
the predictive properties of the framework. Three case studies are discussed:
escalation of cigarettes consumption; conventional treatments similar to nicotine
patches; and alternative medical practices comparable to meditation. Each
computed profile comprises 100 simulations over a period of 160 days for a
virtual subject encountering drugs on the fifth day. The primary outcome
measures of the model include an estimate of the virtual subject's mood, and the
daily account of drug intakes. The main limitation of this study resides in the 21
time-dependent processes which at the same time only partially describe the
complex phenomena of drug addiction, and involve a large number of parameters
which may underconstrain the framework.
Simulated patterns of drug intake, including escalation of drug use and
rehabilitation, predict that reward system neuroadaptations account for mood
stabilization, whereas antireward neuroadaptations delineate mood improvement
and reduction in drug consumption. As an effort toward translational research in
drug use and abuse, the discussed computational framework provides formal
arguments encouraging current rehabilitation therapies to include meditation-like
practices along with pharmaceutical drugs and counseling.
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Figure 12: Diagram of the computational model. Time units differ: t is in minutes and t* in hours.
Output M(t) is the mood estimation within the allostatic framework which combines the
rush/comedown effect of the drug, rc(t), with the virtual subject's cognitive distortion, cd(t). Levels
of observations include the neuropsychological scale in green, the cognitive scale in red, and the
healing scale in orange (32), which are connected to the expanded PK/PD model (37) in light
blue. The cognitive weights, which modulate the ongoing neural activity on the
neuropsychological scale, define the tendency of drug-seeking behavior, G(t*). This
predisposition influences the reward set point, TS(t*), which together with the lowering effect on
reward threshold, T(t), defines decisions about drug intake, Z(t). The cognitive weights influence
the baseline reward threshold, T0(t*), indirectly influence T(t), and are affected by Z(t). A healing
intervention has a direct impact on both cognitive learning and T0(t*), and an indirect effect on
TS(t*) associated with changes in the virtual subject's rationality density, rd(t*). The mood M(t) is a
combination of Z(t), T(t), T0(t*), and TS(t*).
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6.2 Methods: Computational framework for allostasis
A pharmacokinetic/pharmacodynamic (PK/PD) model of allostasis for
laboratory rats has been developed which relates compulsive drug intake to a
chronically deviated baseline reward threshold (37). The PK component of this
model represents how the rat's bloodstream and brain absorb the substance, and
the PD component accounts for the threshold-lowering effect of the drug. The
decision-making process defining the animal's future drug self-administration is
controlled by the negative hedonic valence induced by the substance. Withinsystem alterations are represented by changes in the drug potency index in the
PD component of the model, and between-system adjustments are described by
variations of the baseline reward threshold. Simulations based upon this
computational framework successfully replicate patterns of intravenous cocaine
self-administration observed in laboratory rats, while relying on constant values to
represent the within-system and the between-system adaptations (37).
In the present study, this animal model is translated toward human
application by mathematically describing the within- and the between-system
components as time-dependent functions, and by providing an estimation of the
virtual subject's mood. This discrete-time model, which is shown in Figure 12,
accounts for the behavioral, neuropsychological, and cognitive scales of
observation in humans over time scales of minutes t and hours t*, along with
correlates of brain reward. The model produces computational predictions of drug
intakes, Z(t), and mood, M(t). The provisional measure of M is an aggregate of
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neural and psychological components. The former relies upon the direct
rush/comedown effect of the drug, rc(t), and the latter upon cognitive distortions,
cd(t), emulated as a function of current and previous hedonic adaptations. The
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Behavior Therapy defines cognitive distortions as
"identifiable errors in thinking" (120) which sustain pathologies related to alcohol
and drug use (121) gambling (122,123), eating (124), and Internet use (125).
The behavioral scale includes the binary decision toward Z which depends
on the arithmetical difference between the lowering effect on reward threshold
T(t) and the reward set point TS(t*), similar to (37). The baseline reward threshold
T0(t*) influences T. The thresholds T, TS, and T0, are the reward components
associated respectively with the inverse variation of the brain's reward sensitivity,
the drug's evolving acute effect which is reminiscent of the intracranial selfstimulation paradigm (126), and the minimal drug effect providing the individual
with a reliable outcome (feel high). The drug concentration in the brain is
represented by C(t), which depends on Z and influences T.
Two hypotheses are introduced to account for the time-dependency of
within-system and between-system neuroadaptations. The first hypothesis was
inspired by observations on rats (119) and relates to changes within TS that are
assumed contingent on the tendency for drug-seeking behavior, G(t*), estimated
in (32). Accordingly, within-system adaptations are assumed to be dependent
upon ongoing neural activities which define the current virtual subject's behavior
towards drug use. G assesses the neural activity of brain regions sensitive to
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addictive drugs. Healthy behavior (i.e., avoidance of drug use) corresponds to
positive values of G, and maladaptive behavior (i.e., a tendency towards drugseeking behavior) to negative values. Within-system alterations are included in
the PD component of the model and represented by TS as an alternative to the
drug potency index discussed in (37). After the first drug intake, TS is assumed to
monotonically increase for healthy behavior and exponentially decrease for
maladaptive behavior:


− β ⋅d
 λ ⋅ (1− e ) + TS (tc ) if G(t*) ≥ 0 and ∑ Z ≥ 1

TS (t * +1) =  T (t )⋅ e−γ ⋅d
if G(t*) < 0 and ∑ Z ≥ 1
 S c
otherwise,
 TS (t*)

Eq. 9

where λ, β, and γ, are constants; tc corresponds to the last time t* where G
changed its sign; d is a temporal unit-step counter reset to 0 when G changes its
sign; and ∑ Z ≥ 1 denotes that at least one drug intake occurred up to time t*.
Within-systems neuroadaptations impact the allostatic state of the virtual subject
by affecting M. At first only these adaptations take action, but cooperate with
between-system neuroadaptations after the virtual subject experienced several
drug intakes.
The estimation of G depends on internal processes (S, P, D, and Q) and
external triggers (AS, AP, AD, and AQ), which define the neuropsychological scale
of the model. The negative affective state of nervousness, anxiety, or stress S(t*)
of an addict expands during withdrawal phases (127) due to changes occurring in
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the brain reward and stress systems (3) including the VTA, the NAc, the
amygdala, and the lateral hypothalamus (128). The level of burden or worry P(t*)
related to a person's health state increases as a consequence of drug
consumption (129).
The intensity of drug craving D(t*) strongly correlates with the level of
extracellular dopamine in key brain areas. Animal experiments show how the
concentration of dopamine in the NAc increases during acute drug consumption
(130) and decreases during withdrawal (131). Human studies suggest that
dopamine-related neural activity in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC) intensifies under the influence of drugs (132), and
diminishes during long-term withdrawal (34).
Severe stressors AS(t*) such as electric foot-shocks for laboratory rats
(133) and verbal scolding for humans (134) can lead to the reinstatement of
maladaptive behavior. Acute distress events AP(t*) such as non-fatal overdoses
for injection drug users (135) or coronary heart disease for smokers (136) may
cause the individual to rapidly cease using the substance. After a period of
abstention, rats (137) and humans (138) exposed to drug priming AD(t*) are
more likely to stumble into relapse. Drug-associated cues linked to a particular
environment AQ(t*) can reactivate drug-seeking behavior (139). The magnitude
Q(t*) of these cues depends upon the drug-contingent neural mechanisms of
learning and memory (140) that may facilitate the sensitization of incentive
salience of drug cues leading to compulsive consumption (44).
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The cognitive apparatus of the virtual subject transforms the ongoing
neuropsychological activities into information accessible at the behavioral scale.
Internal processes, external triggers, and healing interventions H(t*) are adapted
by a set of time-varying cognitive weights ωS(t*), ωP(t*), ωD(t*), and constant
parameters ωQ, ωA, and ωH, to estimate the rationality density rd(t*) of the virtual
subject. For the first number of drug intakes, the time-dependent cognitive
weights ωS, ωP, and ωD stochastically adjust and predispose the virtual subject
toward maladaptive behavior, mimicking associative learning between the drug
and its pleasurable effect. The cognitive state, cs(t*), translates rd to reflect the
proportion between inhibition and compulsion driving the estimation of G.
The second computational hypothesis assumes that the baseline reward
threshold T0 depends upon higher-order cognitive processes. This is consistent
with the I-RISA model (34) whereby between-system adaptations are considered
to depend upon learning and memory functions. After a number of drug intakes,
the cognitive substrate of the virtual subject starts to stochastically influence T0 by
means of ωS, ωP, ωD and the healing intervention H(t*). Between-system
alternations are conveyed by T0, defined as a function of the cognitive timedependent weights and H. The modulating influence of ωS, ωP, and ωD on T0 has
opposite valence when a healing intervention occurs (H = 1) than when it does
not (H = 0):
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 T (t*) + δ ⋅ −2 ⋅ H (t*) +1 ⋅
)
T0 (
 0
T0 (t * +1) =  ⋅ (ω S (t*) − ω P (t*) + ω D (t*)) if ∑ Z ≥ α

otherwise,
 T0 (t*)

Eq. 10

where δT0 and α are constants, and ∑ Z ≥ α denotes the period subsequent to at
least α drug intakes. Between-systems neuroadaptations adjust the virtual
subject's allostatic state by altering M. These adaptations arise after α drug
intakes and together with within-systems adaptations influences the virtual
subject's mood.
The time-dependent cognitive weights emulate PFC, OFC, and ACC
alterations that lead addicted persons and healthy individuals to manifest
contrasting saliencies during affective events related to drug consumption
(141,142). When active, healing interventions influence ωS, ωP, ωD, and rd,
inclining the virtual subject toward healthy behavior. Once H becomes idle,
residual cognitive effects on these weights stochastically become permanent.
Different occurrences of H delineate replacement therapies (e.g., nicotine
replacement

therapy)

or

complementary

treatments

(e.g.,

mindfulness

meditation). Both techniques favorably support cigarette-smoking cessation
(143,144). The first is simulated with an active H lasting several days, whereas
the second by a sequence of active H's of much shorter durations.
Formal definitions of the processes in Figure 12 are included in the
Supplementary Material (Appendix A).
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6.2.1 Model validation and provisional assumption
Validation of the system dynamics model is divided into a structural
module and a behavioral module (145). Both aspects were discussed in (37) for
the PK/PD portion of the model of Figure 12 in terms of a sensitivity analysis of
key parameters and output comparison with laboratory animal data. For the drugseeking prediction part of the model, the structural identification and control of
intrinsic bias was discussed in (31), and simulations of plausible scenarios for
human psychoactive drug consumption were discussed in (32).
To further evaluate the validity of the present model, the virtual subject's
mood is considered in addition to archetypal drug-seeking patterns. As
mentioned above, mood alterations caused by an addictive substance are
provisionally assessed as the aggregate of the drug's rush/comedown effect,
rc(t), and consequent cognitive distortion, cd(t). The evolution of rc is defined as
the summation of piece-wise sinusoidal functions each of one period with slightly
exponentially decaying tails that initiate when a drug intake occurs. Cognitive
distortions related to addiction are assumed to depend on the overall current
reward state of the virtual subject which includes T, TS, and T0. Healthy individuals
should not suffer from cognitive distortions: no current drug's effect on reward
threshold, T, should arise, nor should any negative hedonic valences from withinand between-system neuroadaptations, TS and T0. The speculative cd combines
the current reward state of the individual, the current activation of within- and
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between-system neuroadaptations, alongside of previously experienced hedonic
adaptations:
M (t) = rc(t) + cd(t)
with cd(t) = −T (t) + γ M ⋅ ∆TSO(t*) − ∆TSO(t * −1) when ∑ Z ≥ 1,

Eq. 11

where γM is constant; ∑ Z ≥ 1 denotes that at least one drug intake occurred up to
t; and ∆TSO stands for the arithmetic difference between TS and T0. The
formulation of cd is suggested by the temporal difference component employed in
the first model of learning mechanism associated with dopaminergic neurons in
the basal ganglia (92,93).

6.3 Results
Plausible real-life scenarios are illustrated in this section to simulate a
virtual subject who is consuming abused substances. Three case studies
narrating tobacco smoking are considered. The first depicts transitions from early
to heavy smoking; the second considers conventional therapies (e.g., nicotine
patches); and the third represents alternative medical treatments (e.g.,
meditation). Only cognitive correlates of conventional and alternative practices
are emulated in the model at the center of this dissertation. In particular, only
positive cognitive adaptations are emulated, even when emulating conventional
therapies (for which the positive pharmacological effects are not emulated).
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The simulation results include means for 100 simulations and standard
errors of the mean corresponding to a period of 160 days with the drug becoming
available on the fifth day. Changes in the allostatic state of the virtual subject are
estimated through variations of the mood M.
When possible, parameters defining the simulations were chosen
according to human studies. The rat brain apparent volume of distribution for
cocaine used in (37) was replaced with an estimate for (S)-[11C]nicotine in
humans (146). The number of drug intakes defining the initial associative learning
reflected in ωS, ωP, ωD, as well as the constant α in Equation 10, were chosen
according to a clinical study by Difranza at al. (147) which classifies the
progression of physical addiction into four stages: none (stage 1), wanting (stage
2), craving (stage 3), and needing (stage 4). Associative learning may arise until
the needing phase, and the constant α relates to the craving phase. For nicotine,
the four stages correspond to consumption rates of 2.2±3.4, 4.4±5.0, 8.6±7.1, and
13.2±7.7 cigarettes per smoking day (147), respectively. The minimum amount of
time separating consecutive drug intake of 4 seconds in (37) was changed to 30
minutes. All other initial conditions of the present simulations were defined in
accordance with (37) and (32). The values of the parameters used in the
simulations are reported in Table 2.
The three considered case studies are presented in the next section and
in Figure 13, where TS and T0 are constant. These settings correspond to the
results presented by Ahmed and Koob in (37). The three case studies are
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described in Sections 6.3.2 to 6.3.4, where Figures 14 to 19 each include three
Evaluations: in the first both TS and T0 are time-dependent processes according to
Equation 8 and Equation 9, in the second TS is constant, and in the third T0 is
constant. The daily sobriety index is defined as the average number of simulated
runs with at least one daily drug intake.

6.3.1 Baseline: constant reward set point and constant baseline reward
threshold
This section presents simulations based on the model in Figure 12 while
considering the reward set point, TS, and the baseline reward threshold, T0, as
constants. This is comparable to the simulations of drug self-administration in
rats presented by Amhed and Koob in (37) translated to humans.
Figure 13 reports simulations of the three case studies considered in this
chapter, with experimental settings as discussed in Sections 6.3.2 to 6.3.4, when
TS and T0 have constant values throughout the simulations instead of being the
time-dependent functions defined by Equations 9 and 10. The first column
corresponds to Case Study 1 (transition from early to heavy smoking); the
second column to Case Study 2 (nicotine patch therapy); and the third column to
Case Study 3 (practice of meditation). In Figure 13, line A reports the evolution of
the cognitive weights ωS, ωP, and ωD; line B the progression of T, TS, and T0; line C
the prediction of mood M; and line D the average drug consumption and sobriety
index.

94

!
The main difference between the simulated case studies in Figure 13
resides in the evolution of the cognitive weights ωS, ωP, and ωD, which depends on
the recovery process H. As detailed in the next sections, in Case Study 1 there
are no H events, in Case Study 2 the occurrences of H are few and relatively
long-lasting, whereas in Case Study 3 these are more frequent and of shorter in
duration.
The three case studies express a similar evolution of the lowering effect
on reward threshold, T, which is characterized by a loading phase (where the
agent frequency of drug intake is high until satiety is reached) and a consequent
maintenance phase (where the drug intake frequency becomes smaller and
endures for the duration of the simulation). This is visible in Figure 13 (line B and
correspondent close-up) and equates with the results of Ahmed and Koob (37).
The mood M steps down after the loading phase and does not express the
chronic depression anticipated by Koob and Le Moal (3). The average drug
consumption of the virtual subject is stable at ~12 cigarettes/day, and the
sobriety index drops to 0% after the first intake.
The fine details for the simulations presented in Figure 13 can be found in
Figure 20 (Appendix B). The tendency for drug-seeking behavior G, the internal
(S, P, D, and Q) and external processes (AS, AP, AD, and AQ) are different across
the three case studies. The simulations provided in this section are a frame of
reference to assess Equations 9 and 10, and the simulations discussed in the
remainder of this chapter.
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Figure 13: Baseline (TS and T0 are constant). Simulations of virtual behavior for cigarette
consumption over a period of 160 days. Cigarettes are available on the fifth day. Results are the
average of 100 runs and correspond to the three case studies discussed in this chapter. Line A
shows the evolution of cognitive weights ωS (red), ωP (blue), and ωD (black); line B the progression
of T (blue), TS (black), and T0 (red); line C the evolution of the subject's mood M; and line D the
average number of drug intakes (red) and the sobriety index (blue). Further details of these
simulations are reported in Figure 20.
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6.3.2 Case Study 1: Allostatic state trajectory during escalation of drug
consumption
This section discusses a virtual subject who engages in cigarette smoking
five days after the simulation begins. Figure 14 presents the evolution of
cognitive weights and reward components, whereas Figure 15 mood and health
state assessments. In Evaluation 1, changes in ωS, ωP, and ωD are gradual; T is at
first weaker than TS but eventually surpasses it, and T0 continually increases; M
increasingly oscillates around its downslope; the average drug consumption
increases and the sobriety index diminishes. Upon completion of the simulation,
this virtual subject is characterized by an average consumption of ~42
intakes/day (~2 packs) and a sobriety index of ~11%, comparable to a severe
stage 4.
In Evaluation 2, the cognitive adaptations occur significantly faster than for
Evaluation 1. T and TS are approximately equal at first, but eventually T becomes
larger than TS as T0 constantly increases. M abruptly decreases during the
loading phase and subsequently manifests a negative trend enclosed by minor
oscillations. The average consumption quickly increases and the virtual subject
reaches a satiety state of ~48 cigarettes/day. Note that the number of intakes
defining satiety is not an explicit constraint defined in the model. The sobriety
index is consistently at zero.
In Evaluation 3, the evolution of the virtual subject's processes is very
similar to the predictions for Evaluation 1, but T decreases and M has a less
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negative downslope. This evaluation ends with ~34 intakes/day and ~25%
sobriety.
Additional details can be found in the Supplementary Figures (Appendix
B). Figure 21 includes the fine details for Case Study 1, and Figures 22 and 23
show how different probabilities defining changes in ωS, ωP, and ωD influence the
predicted consumption rates and mood downslope. If the first smoked cigarette
within the simulations is considered as the first ever in the life of the virtual
subject, then Figures 22 and 23 can be considered to relate to different rates of
progression from recreational smoking toward heavy smoking.
Case Study 1 indicates that a virtual subject consuming drugs for the first
time, or relapsing after a period of abstinence, undergoes a continuous negative
shift in mood baseline which directly correlates with the strength of cognitive
learning facilitating drug consumption. In addition, the virtual subject suffers
growing mood swings during protracted consumption. When TS is constant, the
mood substantially decreases during the first number of drug intakes, and the
virtual subject rapidly reaches the satiety consumption rate. With T0 constant, the
simulated mood has a weaker negative tendency and oscillates less.
This Case Study shows that escalation in drug consumption occurs
together with chronic depression of mood. These simulations predict that the
virtual subject's mood strongly drops when only between-system adaptations are
operative, and moderately decreases when only within-system adaptations are
operative.
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6.3.3 Case Study 2: Allostatic state trajectory during conventional
therapies
The profile presented in this section is similar to Case Study 1 but also
includes healing interventions, H. Five-day long H events are activated at t = 1920
and t = 2280 [hours]. This is intended to emulate 25 days of a replacement
therapy using a nicotine transdermal system for 2 five-day periods separated
from each other by 15 days. Case Study 2, does not replicate the
pharmacological effects of the replacement drug, but rather aims to mimic
possible cognitive facilitations toward a healthy state which may be enabled by
this drug.
All Evaluations for Case Studies 1 and 2 are similar until H is activated.
During the first therapeutic period in Figures 16 and 17, ωS, ωP, and ωD are
influenced by H to promote healthier behavior. This positive effect partially
persists after the first period of therapy and is further strengthened by the
second. In Evaluation 1, the activation of H causes a small upswing in T, a strong
upswing in TS, and a decrease in the upslope of T0. The degradation of M
becomes less accentuated after the treatment. The average drug consumption
drops and the sobriety index rises while H is active. This experiment endpoint is
comparable to an advanced stage 3 or an intermediate stage 4, with a
consumption rate of ~14 intakes/day and a sobriety index of ~62%. In Evaluation
2, both T and T0 reduce their upslope during the therapy, while the effect on M is
negligible. The average consumption steadily increases ending at ~47
intakes/day, and the sobriety index drops to zero. In Evaluation 3, the
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progression of the virtual subject's processes is similar to Evaluation 1 but
somewhat slower. M stabilizes and becomes nearly constant after the therapy.
This endpoint is ~8 intakes/day and ~81% sobriety.
Additional fine detail for Case Study 2 can be found in Figure 24 in the
Supplementary Figures (Appendix B). Figures 25 and 26 show how different
probabilities defining the influence of H affect the permanent predicted
consumption rates. Higher probabilities lead the virtual subject to stage 1 or
intermediate stage 2, whereas lower probabilities to advanced stage 4. The same
sets of probabilities are tested when TS is constant (Figures 27 and 28) and when
T0 is constant (Figures 29 and 30). For TS constant, the virtual subject always gets
to a satiety consumption rate, and reveals a shy positive trend in M for the
highest probabilities along with a decrease in average consumption. For T0
constant, M becomes constant after the therapy and its variations become
smaller as the tested probabilities become higher.
Case study 2 shows how a few yet long healing interventions diminish the
negative trend in the virtual addict's mood. Early indications of mood increase
appear when healing signals are highly effective. When TS is constant, curative
effects on the mood are negligible, unless cognitive learning is exceptionally
successful. Even though positive, the influences on mood for this extreme case
are quite limited. With T0 constant, the mood stabilizes after healing interventions
and remains roughly constant.
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This Case Study exemplifies the effect of prolonged healing interventions.
These simulations predict that the virtual subject's mood continues to worsen in
spite of therapeutic events when only between-system adaptations are operative.
The predicted mood stabilizes as a consequence of healing periods when only
within-system adaptations are operative.

6.3.4 Case Study 3: Allostatic state trajectory during alternative medical
treatments
The profile in Figures 18 and 19 present a different type of healing
intervention than in Case Study 2. At simulated times t ∈ {1920, 1960, 2000, 2040,
2280, 2320, 2360, 2400} [hours], a fifteen hour H event is activated. This is
intended to emulate 2 five-day healing periods during which the virtual subject
undergoes four meditation practices separated by 40 hours. The benefits of each
practice last for 15 hours, and the two healing periods are 10 days apart. Other
than H event durations and activation times, all the parameters defining this Case
Study are the same as in Case Studies 1 and 2.
During the first period of meditation, ωS, ωP, and ωD strongly adjust. The
enduring positive changes are additionally expanded after the second period of
meditations. In Evaluation 1, T decreases before meditation, increases during
meditation, and finally decreases again afterwards. There is an upswing of TS
when H is active. T0 initially increases, becomes constant after the first healing
session, and decreases after the second. After the first period of meditation, M
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stops declining, and after it increases with reduced oscillation. The average drug
consumption significantly decreases after the first healing period and further
decreases after the second. The sobriety index robustly increases during the
treatment. The endpoint of this evaluation corresponds to ~1 intake/day and
~97% sobriety, placing the virtual subject in stage 1 or early stage 2. In
Evaluation 2, T variations are minors, and T0 is a wide bell-shaped curve which
maximal height corresponds to the healing periods. Activations of H first lead to
stabilization of M, and then to its increase. The bell-shaped average drug
consumption reaches its maximum and starts to decrease when H is active,
finishing at ~12 intakes/day. The sobriety index starts to increase shortly after the
end of the treatment reaching ~40% at the end of the simulation. Evaluation 3 is
comparable to Evaluation 1 but M stabilizes after the therapy rather than
increasing, and its final state is characterized by <1 intake/day and ~99%
sobriety.
Additional details for Case Study 3 can be found in the Supplementary
Figures (Appendix B). Figure 31 shows the fine details. Figures 32 and 33
illustrate how different probabilities defining the influence of H permanently
impact the predicted consumption rates. Higher probabilities lead the virtual
subject to cease using the drug, whereas lower probabilities to advanced stage 1
or intermediate stage 2. The same sets of probabilities are tested when TS is
constant (Figures 34 and 35) and when T0 is constant (Figures 36 and 37). For TS
constant, the virtual subject always gets to its satiety consumption rate; and after
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the treatment M increases. For T0 constant, M tends to become constant after the
therapy and its variations become smaller as the probability becomes higher.
Case study 3 displays how phasic healing interventions increase the mood
of the virtual addict. This increase becomes very bold while healing signals have
high effectiveness. Also, when TS is constant, mood increases as a direct
correlation of healing success. With T0 constant, after healing interventions the
mood stabilizes and becomes approximately constant.
This Case Study exemplifies the effect of brief healing interventions that
follow one another at short intervals. These simulations predict that the virtual
subject's mood increases as a result of curative events when only betweensystem adaptations are operative. The predicted mood stabilizes but does not
improve after healing periods when only within-system adaptations are operative.
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Figure 14: Case Study 1 (cognitive weights and reward components). Simulations of virtual
behavior for cigarette consumption over a period of 160 days. Cigarettes are available on the fifth
day. Results are the average of 100 runs. Evaluation 1 simulates both TS and T0 as timedependent processes. TS is constant and T0 time-dependent in Evaluation 2, TS is time-dependent
and T0 constant in Evaluation 3. Column A shows the evolution of cognitive weights ωS (red), ωP
(blue), and ωD (black); and column B the progression of T (blue), TS (black), and T0 (red). The gray
shades correspond to SEM. The time-scales are hours for column A, and minutes for column B.
Further details of these simulations are reported in Figure 21.
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Figure 15: Case Study 1 (mood and health state assessments). Simulations of virtual
behavior for cigarette consumption over a period of 160 days. Cigarettes are available on the fifth
day. Results are the average of 100 runs. Evaluation 1 simulates both TS and T0 as timedependent processes. TS is constant and T0 time-dependent in Evaluation 2, TS is time-dependent
and T0 constant in Evaluation 3. Column A shows the evolution of the subject's mood M; and
column B the average number of drug intakes (red) and the sobriety index (blue). The gray shade
in column A corresponds to SEM. The time-scales are minutes for column A, and days for column
D. Further details of these simulations are reported in Figure 21.
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Figure 16: Case Study 2 (cognitive weights and reward components). Simulations of virtual
behavior for cigarette consumption over a period of 160 days. Cigarettes are available on the fifth
day. Results are the average of 100 runs. Evaluation 1 simulates both TS and T0 as timedependent processes. TS is constant and T0 time-dependent in Evaluation 2, TS is time-dependent
and T0 constant in Evaluation 3. In all evaluations, the recovery process H is activated at t = 1920
and t = 2280 [hours] (in light pink) and stays active for 120 hours (dark pink). Column A shows the
evolution of cognitive weights ωS (red), ωP (blue), and ωD (black); and column B the progression of
T (blue), TS (black), and T0 (red). The gray shades correspond to SEM. The time-scales are hours
for column A, minutes for column B. Further details of these simulations are reported in Figure 24.
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Figure 17: Case Study 2 (mood and health state assessments). Simulations of virtual
behavior for cigarette consumption over a period of 160 days. Cigarettes are available on the fifth
day. Results are the average of 100 runs. Evaluation 1 simulates both TS and T0 as timedependent processes. TS is constant and T0 time-dependent in Evaluation 2, TS is time-dependent
and T0 constant in Evaluation 3. In all evaluations, the recovery process H is activated at t = 1920
and t = 2280 [hours] (in light pink) and stays active for 120 hours (dark pink). Column A shows the
evolution of the subject's mood M; and column D the average number of drug intakes (red) and
the sobriety index (blue). The gray shade in column A corresponds to SEM. The time-scales are
minutes for column A, and days for column B. Further details of these simulations are reported in
Figure 24.
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Figure 18: Case Study 3 (cognitive weights and reward components). Simulations of virtual
behavior for cigarette consumption over a period of 160 days. Cigarettes are available on the fifth
day. Results are the average of 100 runs. Evaluation 1 simulates both TS and T0 as timedependent processes. TS is constant and T0 time-dependent in Evaluation 2, TS is time-dependent
and T0 constant in Evaluation 3. In all evaluations, the recovery process H is activated at t ∈
{1920, 1960, 2000, 2040, 2280, 2320, 2360, 2400} [hours] (in light pink) and stays active for 15 hours
(dark pink). Column A shows the evolution of cognitive weights ωS (red), ωP (blue), and ωD (black);
and column B the progression of T (blue), TS (black), and T0 (red). The gray shades correspond to
SEM. The time-scales are hours for column A, and minutes for column B. Further details of these
simulations are reported in Figure 31.
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Figure 19: Case Study 3 (mood and health state assessments). Simulations of virtual
behavior for cigarette consumption over a period of 160 days. Cigarettes are available on the fifth
day. Results are the average of 100 runs. Evaluation 1 simulates both TS and T0 as timedependent processes. TS is constant and T0 time-dependent in Evaluation 2, TS is time-dependent
and T0 constant in Evaluation 3. In all evaluations, the recovery process H is activated at t ∈
{1920, 1960, 2000, 2040, 2280, 2320, 2360, 2400} [hours] (in light pink) and stays active for 15 hours
(dark pink). Column A shows the evolution of the subject's mood M; and column B the average
number of drug intakes (red) and the sobriety index (blue). The gray shade in columns A
corresponds to SEM. The time-scales are minutes for column A, and days for column B. Further
details of these simulations are reported in Figure 31.
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6.4 Concluding remarks
The computational model presented in this article includes higher-level
cognitive elements in addition to behavioral and neural elements. This may raise
ethical questions and influence how addicted humans are viewed by society (59).
A multi-leveled overlook of addiction that includes biological/psychological/social
(35), and even spiritual (15) elements is suggested as a possible compromise to
restrain such an undesirable possibility (36). The multiscale standpoint of the
framework shown in Figure 12 aims to promote a more comprehensive
understanding of addiction and provides prospect for recovery, which seems to
occur more often than commonly believed (140). In the present chapter a
multiscale computational model is developed to further explore the allostatic
theory of addiction (3) in terms of a KR model (101) in line with the exploratory
review in (102), which aims to engage hypothesis-driven research (148). Such an
approach can facilitate the detection of ambiguous knowledge that requires future
biological and computational exploration in order to better understand this
disease. The framework presented in this chapter supports the view that
integrative medicine can be an effective approach to improve treatment of drug
addiction.
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CHAPTER 7
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The computational framework for allostasis presented above unites and
elaborates two earlier formal models (37,32). The first relies on a closed-loop
representation of the pharmacokinetics, the pharmacodynamics, and a decisionmaking processes delineating future cocaine consumption in rats (37). The
second is a dynamical system model that encompasses neuropsychological and
cognitive elements to mimic human occurrences of natural recoveries (32). The
allostatic theory of addiction comprises within-system and between-system
neuroadaptations that influence the brain's reward system: the former by a direct
impact, and the latter by means of antireward system activations. The function of
these adaptations is to balance the hedonic state of the addict and to provide the
organism with a reasonable operational existence. Manifestations of the allostatic
state come through mood alterations (3,51).
The present manuscript is an exploratory instance of knowledge repository
(KR) modeling for addiction (101) which investigates cognitive correlates of the
allostatic theory. A KR model comprises a collection of empirical observations
that are mathematically translated and unified to predict the natural course of an
entity (101). This class of models promotes the identification of plausible
hypotheses which, if experimentally tested, could provide pertinent knowledge to
further improve the computational framework. The repetition of this investigative
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process initiates a hypothesis-driven sequence of experiments supporting
translational research (148). The present model assembles building blocks of
neuropsychology, cognition, and behavior into a multiscale computational
framework aiming to facilitate rational entailments of the allostatic theory.
The computational description of a complex phenomenon such as drug
use and abuse requires finding a compromise between two desirable but
incompatible objectives. On the one hand, the biological components defining the
model embrace a simplified ontology of addiction, and on the other hand, the
mathematical features of the framework include a sizable number of elements
and parameters making the model underconstrained. Moreover, a useful formal
system should suggest testable hypotheses to further advance the investigated
field. These perspectives are considered herein.

7.1 Biological conjectures and limitations
The simulations discussed in this investigation represent archetypal
patterns of drug-seeking including transitions from recreational to heavy use, and
rehabilitation. They express the comorbidity between addiction and mood
depression for an addict vulnerable to both reward and antireward system
neuroadaptations. As drug intake proceeds, the model estimates a steady
decrease in the addict's mood that increasingly oscillates until the virtual subject
reaches the satiety rate of drug consumption. This computational model also
suggests a possible remission to the individual's healthy state as a consequence
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of cognitive adjustments induced by conventional or alternative treatments. The
model predicts a contraction in the addict's negative mood tendency and
fluctuations while solely reward system neuroadaptations influence the hedonic
valence of the individual. This rigidity endures during healing interventions as the
model predicts stabilization of the subject's mood, rather than its increase. When
the unique source of neuroadaptations affecting the subject's mood relies on the
antireward system, the model predicts a noteworthy negative deflection of the
subject's mood during the first number of drug intakes. The model also predicts
that neuroadaptations occurring during healing periods, and that are uniquely
induced by the antireward system, empower the individual with the possibility to
regain a healthy mood state. These simulations also suggest that the satiety rate
of drug consumption is reached more rapidly when the individual expresses only
antireward system adaptations.
An important biological limitation of this model resides in the omission of
mechanisms responsible for the development of pharmacodynamic tolerance,
which arises when receptors or second messengers are blunted by chronic
exposure to drugs such as alcohol or opiates (11). One approach to overcome
this shortcoming can be found in the expansion and incorporation of a cellular
and molecular scale within the model. Such elaboration could also enhance the
computational framework with a greater descriptive ability for diverse classes of
drugs. For nicotine dependence, a suitable candidate lies in a previously
presented KR model which describes how dopaminergic signaling in the VTA
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increases through nicotine intake and influences synaptic plasticity in the dorsal
striatum, making cigarette smoking compulsive (103). A complementary
candidate resides in a model describing how variations of extracellular levels of
dopamine and glutamate within the brain's reward system impact the virtual
subject's likelihood of drug consumption (149).
The presented model considers that the virtual subject is consuming some
addictive substance rather than a specific kind. This is a major restriction of the
framework which could be addressed by enhancing the pharmacokinetic (PK)
module of the model. Previous studies present hypothetical but substancespecific PK units that could be included in the model: e.g., for nicotine and
alcohol as reviewed in (150), or cocaine (151).
Furthermore, the model could be elaborated to incorporate elements
related to medical conditions that occur frequently together with drug abuse, such
as posttraumatic stress disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and
schizophrenia (152); as well as to include components of genetic regulatory
networks pertinent to addiction (153).

7.2 The model's high dimensionality
A KR model is inclined toward a high-dimensionality due to a large number
of descriptive variables, since its objective is to describe the studied phenomenon
as comprehensively as possible. The predictions presented in this investigation
rely on the high-dimensional dynamical model shown in Figure 12 that comprises
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twenty-one time-dependent biological processes translated into the same number
of mathematical expressions. In addition, there are seventy-one parameters, the
setting of which can dramatically affect the model's behavior. Even though a
mere approximation of the biological complexity delineating drug addiction in real
life, such (computational) high-dimensionality could simulate an assortment of
dynamics larger than the ones expressed by living creatures, and consequently
limit the model's predictive power. The natural processes included in the
presented computational framework are sizable, yet their descriptions are
determined conservatively. For instance, the processes comprising the
neuropsychological scale of the model have limited domains of definition which
facilitate their tractability. These restricted domains reflect biological plausibility
and ease the sensitivity analysis, necessary for the model's validation as
discussed in (31).
Another attempt of mathematical moderation resides in the definition of
healing interventions. The same mathematical definition used with different
calibrations to mimic conventional and alternative cures was intentionally
deployed as a lower-bound estimation of real-life cleansing episodes. In fact, the
minimal duration of nicotine replacement therapies ranges from three weeks to
three months (143), and mindfulness meditation requires four weeks of training to
effectively influence regions surrounding the ACC of humans (154). Even though
broadly delineated and similarly defined, these healing emulations provisionally
advocate that for some nicotine addicts short interventions closely spaced in time
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(e.g., meditation episodes) have a more beneficial health impact on the brain's
cognitive substrate than longer interventions (e.g., nicotine patches). This
conjecture is supported by a recent translational study where memories related to
drug consumptions are triggered at different times to facilitate their extinction and
decrease heroin craving in recovering humans (155,156). The simulated healing
processes also corroborate a recent cohort study debating how nicotine
replacement therapies may not be the universal solution to attain long-term
smoking abstinence (157).

7.3 Conclusion: implications for treatments
The current manuscript provides formal arguments, conditional upon the
validity of the hypotheses defining the computational framework, in favor of a
stronger consideration of the addict's cognitive state evolution throughout the
treatment process. In particular, this investigation suggests that higher rates of
rehabilitation from drug addiction in humans can be reached by combining
medical therapies that employ pharmaceutical drugs and counseling along with
non-conventional treatments.
Several pharmacotherapies are available for smoking cessation, as for
example nicotine in various forms (gums, patches, inhalers, tablets) and
antidepressant drugs (144). Clinical studies show that these replacement
therapies enhance the likelihood of rehabilitation by restraining drug craving
during abstinence. The escalation of nicotine craving during smoking cessation is
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lower for therapies involving the use of two medications rather than for
monotherapies, and results in a higher cessation rate, respectively 54% and 45%
in (157). Non-pharmacological interventions included in the therapy, such as
behavioral counseling and personal support, aim to further increase smoking
cessation rates and are recognized as primary components for the therapy's
success (158). Behavioral counseling positively impacts cessation rates
(159,160) by providing patients with coping skills effective in the reduction of
withdrawal symptoms (161), but is less significant in preventing relapse (162).
With respect to rehabilitation, the combination of pharmaceutical drugs is not
effective on all occasions. For smokers with low dependence to nicotine and
living in high-risk social environments (e.g., with a smoking partner) there is no
significant difference in success rates of therapies involving one or the
combination of two medications (161).
Behavioral counseling and personal support are instances of behavioralcognitive therapies: non-pharmacological interventions which flourished from the
1960s for the treatment of depression and anxiety (163,164,165). A
complementary category of non-pharmacological interventions resides in mindbody practices, which include mindfulness meditation, guided imagery, and
relaxation (166). Both the definitions of behavioral-cognitive (165) and mind-body
(166) practices rely on the beneficial impact that healthy cognitive states exert on
the person's overall well being. A patient undergoing behavioral-cognitive therapy
learns how to recognize and manage real life situations that are negatively
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evaluated because of cognitive distortions, whereas mind-body practices provide
the patient with a more realistic awareness that decreases irrational thoughts. In
both cases the objective is to lead the patient to healthier physical and
psychological states.
Behavioral-cognitive practices have demonstrated their positive impact on
smoking cessation (162,167), and mind-body techniques related to the treatment
of nicotine addiction suffer from a shortage of related investigations (168), even
though recent studies demonstrate their great potential. Preliminary experimental
support in favor of mindfulness meditation as a practice decreasing relapse rates
for post-rehabilitation patients was provided in a study including 168 participants
who

ceased

the

use

of

substances

including

alcohol,

cocaine,

and

methamphetamines (169).
The rational speculation that arises while considering pharmacological and
non-pharmacological healing practices suggests that current therapies deploying
one or multiple pharmacological means along with counseling will raise their
success rates by uniting with alternative medical practices. The computational
framework presented in this investigation provides formal arguments to endorse
this conjecture as the allostatic state of an addict, assessed through mood
variations, is shown to improve because of cognitive interventions provided by
practices comparable to those of conventional and alternative medicine.
If the predictions delivered by the computational model discussed in this
investigation constitute a fair approximation to describe how cigarette smoking
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influences the allostatic state of a human addicted to nicotine, then it is expected
that an integrative medicine approach to drug rehabilitation will provide higher
cessation rates and lower relapse rates than current therapies. Given that the
allostatic theory of addiction is not limited to the description of a particular
substance of abuse, this prediction should apply by extension also to addictive
substances including heroin, alcohol, and others.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTARY METHODS

This Appendix reports the definitions of the computational framework in
Figure 12.
Notations
Different time scales are used: t represents time in minutes, and t*
represents time in hours.
t

When used as a conditional term, the sum

∑ Z(s)

is abbreviated with

s=0

∑Z

and denotes the total number of drug intakes since the beginning of the

simulation.
The inequality t ≥ tGO indicates that the current time t is equal or grater than
the time of the first drug intake tGO. The presented simulations use tGO = 5 [day].
 0 if x < 0

The bounding function σ is defined as σ (x) =  x if x ∈ [ 0,1] .

 1 if x > 1
The parameter ν, with ν ∈ [-0.05, 0.05], denotes the uniform noise that is
different for every process and changes at each time step.

MM1. Expanded PK/PD
(Equation S1) Mood - M

M (t) = rc(t) + cd(t),
where
rc(t) is the rush/comedown effect of the drug, defined below, and
cd(t) is the cognitive dissonance, defined below.
(Equation S2) Rush/comedown effect of the drug - rc
2
1  t−s  
2

t
− 



t
−
s


2 ∆
,
rc(t) = ∑ Z(s)⋅ α − β ⋅ 
 ⋅e




∆
s=0


where
Z(t) is the occurrence of drug intakes, defined below, and
α, β, and ∆ are constants ∈ ! (e.g., α = 40, β = 60, and ∆ = 10).
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(Equation S3) Cognitive distortion - cd
 −T (t) + γ ⋅ ∆TSO(t*) − ∆TSO(t * −1) if ∑ Z ≥ 1
M
cd(t +1) = 
otherwise,
 0
where
γM is a constant ∈ ! (e.g., γM = 0.3),
T(t) is the lowering effect on reward threshold, defined below,
∆TSO(t*) = TS(t*) – T0(t*), where TS(t*) is the reward set point, and
T0(t*) is the baseline reward threshold, both defined below, and
∑ Z is defined above.
(Equation S4) Drug intakes - Z
 1 if T (t) - T (t*) > 0 and ∆ ≥ a and t ≥ t
S
Z
GO
Z(t) = 
 0 otherwise,
where
T(t) is the lowering effect on reward threshold, defined below,
TS(t*) is the reward set point, defined below,
∆Z represents the number of minutes elapsed since the last drug
intake, and
α is a constant ∈ " (e.g., α = 30 [minute]).
(Equation S5) Lowering effect on reward threshold - T
T ⋅ C(t)
T (t) = T0 (t*) − max
,
T50 + C(t)
where
T0(t*) is the baseline reward threshold, defined below,
Tmax is the maximum effect of the drug (e.g., Tmax = 120),
T50 is the index of drug potency (e.g., T50 = 588.6 [nM]), and
C(t) is the drug concentration in the brain, defined below.
(Equation S6) Drug concentration in the brain - C
t
k12
C(t) = D ⋅
⋅ ∑ Z(s)⋅ ( e− β ⋅(t−s) − e−α⋅(t−s) ),
Vb (α − β ) s=0
where
D is the drug unit dose (e.g., D = 250 [μg]),
k12 is the compartment rate constant (e.g., k12 = 0.0054),
Vb is the apparent volume of distribution in the brain (e.g., Vb = 1.67,
from (146)),
α and β are the aggregate rate constants as discussed in (37), and
Z(t) is the occurrence of drug intakes, defined above.
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(Equation S7) Reward set point - TS

− β ⋅d
 λ ⋅ (1− e ) + TS (tc ) if G(t*) ≥ 0 and ∑ Z ≥ 1

TS (t * +1) =  T (t )⋅ e−γ ⋅d
if G(t*) < 0 and ∑ Z ≥ 1
 S c
otherwise,
 TS (t*)
where
TS(0) is a constant (e.g. TS(0) = 75),
+
β, γ, and λ are constants ∈ ! (e.g., β = 0.05, γ = 0.05, λ = 100),
d is a time-steps counter, reset to 0 when the sign of G(t*) changes,
tc is the time t* of last change of sign of G(t*),
G(t*) is the tendency of drug-seeking behavior, defined below, and
∑ Z is defined above.
(Equation S8) Baseline reward threshold - T0
 T (t*) + δ ⋅ −2 ⋅ H (t*) +1 ⋅ ω (t*) − ω (t*) + ω (t*) if ∑ Z ≥ α
 0
)( S
)
T0 (
P
D
T0 (t * +1) = 
otherwise,
 T0 (t*)
where
T0(0) is a constant (e.g. T0(0) = 100),
+
δT0 is a constant ∈ ! (e.g., δT0 = 0.03),
H(t*) is the healing intervention process, defined below,
ωS(t*), ωP(t*), and ωD(t*) are the cognitive time-dependent weights,
defined below,
+
α is a constant ∈ " (e.g., α = 20 [intakes]); similar to stage 4 in
(147), and
∑ Z is defined above.

MM2. Cognitive scale
(Equation S9) Rationality density - rd
rd(t*) = −ω S (t*)⋅ S(t*) + ω P (t*)⋅ P(t*) − ω D (t*)⋅ D(t*) −

−ωQ ⋅ AQ(t*) + ω A ⋅ [ AS(t*) + AP(t*) + AD(t*)] + ω H ⋅ H (t*),
where

ωS(t*), ωP(t*), and ωD(t*) are the cognitive time-dependent weights,
defined below,
S(t*), P(t*), and D(t*) are the internal processes, defined below,
AS(t*), AP(t*), AD(t*), and AQ(t*) are the external processes, defined
below, and
H(t*) is the healing intervention process, defined below.
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(Equation S10) Cognitive weights - ω S, ω P, ω D, ω Q, ω A, ω H
• For i ∈ {Q, A, H}:
ω=c
where
+
c is a constant ∈ ! (e.g., ωQ = 0.28, ωA = 0.35, ωH = 0.8).
• For i ∈ {S, P, D}:

ωi (t*) = max (αi (t * −1) + ϑ i ⋅ H (t*), 0 ),
with




αi (t * +1) = 




αi (t*) + ϑ i

if A

αi (t*) − ηi

if B

αi (t*) + ϑ i − ηi

if A and B

αi (t*)

otherwise,

where

αi(0) is a constant (e.g., αS(0) = 0.7, αP(0) = 1.2, αD(0) = 1),
Conditions A and B are conditional terms defined as:
A : if H(Θ(t*)) = 1 and pA(t*) < P(Hηi),
[for some probability, and if H is active, and at last time-step of activation]

where Θ(t*) is defined below
t*

B : if

∑ Z(s) > 0 and p

B

(t*) < P(Zηi) and ∑ Z ≤ β,

s=t*−1

[for the first number of drug intakes, and for a certain probability, and if in
the past hour there was at least one drug intake]
+

where β is a constant ∈ " (e.g., β = 15 [intakes]),
similar to stage 3 in (147)
pA(t*) and pB(t*) are values sampled from a standard uniform
distribution at each time-step t*,
P(Hηi) and P(Zηi) are constants ∈ [0,1] which denote, respectively,
the probabilities of permanent changes in cognitive weights ωS(t*),
ωP(t*), and ωD(t*) after a healing intervention or after a drug intake,
with
S
P
D
(e.g.)
P(Hηi) P(HηS) = 0.7 P(HηP) = 0.9 P(HηD) = 0.6
P(Zηi) P(ZηS) = 0.2 P(ZηP) = 0.1 P(ZηD) = 0.05
H(t*) is the healing intervention process, defined below, and
ϑi and ηi are constants in the following domains:
S
P
D
–

+

–

ϑi ∈ ! (e.g., ϑS = –0.26) ∈ ! (e.g., ϑP = –0.42) ∈ ! (e.g., ϑS = –0.32)
–
+
–
ηi ∈ ! (e.g., ηS = –0.1) ∈ ! (e.g., ηS = 0.05) ∈ ! (e.g., ηS = –0.15)
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(Equation S11) Cognitive state - cs
1
1
cs(t*) = tanh (α ⋅ cs(t * −1) + β ⋅ rd(t*) + γ ) +
2
2
where
+
α and β are constants ∈ ! (e.g., α = 0.25, β = 0.25)
γ is a constant ∈ ! (e.g., γ = –0.4052); this constant can also be
computed using the following equation, as described in (31):
1
γ = α − β ⋅ (ω S (0) − ω P (0) + ω D (0) + ωQ + ω A ) , where
2
ωS(0), ωP(0), and ωD(0) a are the values of the cognitive
time-dependent weights at time t* = 0,
α and β are the same constants used for cs(t*).

MM3. Healing scale
(Equation S12) Healing intervention - H
 1 if p(t*) < P(nr) or if d ∈ 1, Θ(t*)
[
]
H (t*) = 
 0 otherwise,
where
P(nr) is the probability of an healing intervention, P(nr) ∈ [0,1]; this
probability can be based on data as in (32),
p(t*) is a value sampled from a standard uniform distribution at each
time-step t*; in the simulations presented in this article, H
processes are triggered at specific times,
d is a time step counter reset at every instance of H, and
Θ(t*) is the activation time of H, which increases for consecutive
instances:
 Θ(t*) + δ
if p(t*) < P(nr)
i

if d ∈ [1, Θ(t * −1)]
Θ(t*) =  Θ(t * −1)

 max ( 0, Θ(t*) − δd ) otherwise,
where
+

δi and δd are constants ∈ " , (e.g., δi = 15, δd = 1
[hour]).
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MM4. Neuropsychological scale
The internal processes are S, P, D, and Q (29). The external triggers are
AS, AP, AD, and AQ (29).
(Equation S13) Stress - S

− β ⋅d
 σ (1− (1− S0 ) ⋅ e + ν ) if G(t*) > 0

S(t*) =  σ ( S(t * −1) + ν )
if G(t*) = 0

−γ ⋅d
if G(t*) < 0,
 σ ( S0 ⋅ e + ν )

where
S0 is the value S(tc), where tc is the time t* of last change of sign of
G(t*),
+
β and γ are constants ∈ ! (e.g., β = 0.002, γ = 0.002),
d is a time-steps counter, reset to 0 when the sign of G(t*) changes,
G(t*) is the tendency of drug-seeking behavior, defined below, and
ν and σ (x) are defined above.
(Equation S14) Pain - P

− β ⋅d
if G(t*) > 0
 σ ( P0 ⋅ e + ν )

P(t*) =  σ ( P(t * −1) + ν )
if G(t*) = 0

−γ ⋅d
 σ (1− (1− P0 )⋅ e + ν ) if G(t*) < 0,

where
P0 is the value P(tc), where tc is the time t* of last change of sign of
G(t*),
+
β and γ are constants ∈ ! (e.g., β = 0.0002, γ = 0.01),
d is a time-steps counter, reset to 0 when the sign of G(t*) changes,
G(t*) is the tendency of drug-seeking behavior, defined below, and
ν and σ (x) are defined above.
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(Equation S15) Drug craving - D

− β ⋅d
 σ (1− (1− D0 ) ⋅ e + ν ) if G(t*) > 0 and d ∈ [1, τ ]

− β ⋅d
if G(t*) > 0 and d > τ
 σ ( D'0 ⋅ e + ν )
D(t*) = 
if G(t*) = 0
 σ ( D(t * −1) + ν )

−γ ⋅d
 σ (1− (1− D0 ) ⋅ e + ν ) if G(t*) < 0,

where
D0 is the value D(tc), where tc is the time t* of last change of sign of
G(t*),
D'0 is the value D(tc+τ), where tc is the time t* of last change of sign
+
of G(t*), and τ is a constant ∈ ! (e.g., τ = 20 [hour]),
+
β and γ are constants ∈ " (e.g., β = 0.00002, γ = 0.002),
d is a time-steps counter, reset to 0 when the sign of G(t*) changes,
G(t*) is the tendency of drug-seeking behavior, defined below, and
ν and σ (x) are defined above.
(Equation S16) Saliency to drug cues - Q
 σ Q(t * −1) + ν
if G(t*) > 0 and d ∈ [1, τ ] or if G(t*) = 0
)
 (

− β ⋅d
if G(t*) > 0 and d > τ
Q(t*) =  σ (Q'0 ⋅ e + ν )

−γ ⋅d
 σ (1− (1− Q0 ) ⋅ e + ν ) if G(t*) < 0,

where
Q0 is the value Q(tc), where tc is the time t* of last change of sign of
G(t*),
Q'0 is the value Q(tc+τ), where tc is the time t* of last change of sign
+
of G(t*), and τ is a constant ∈ ! (e.g., τ = 10 [hour]),
+
β and γ are constants ∈ " (e.g., β = 0.002, γ = 0.0005),
d is a time-steps counter, reset to 0 when the sign of G(t*) changes,
G(t*) is the tendency of drug-seeking behavior, defined below, and
ν and σ (x) are defined above.
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(Equation S17) Acute shock - AS
 S
if G(t*) > 0 and p(t*) < P(AS) or if d ∈ [1, τ 1 ]
 0
AS(t*) =  ρ ⋅ AS(t * −1) if d ∈ [τ 1, τ 2 ]

otherwise,
 0
where
+

S0 and ρ are constants ∈ ! (e.g., S0 = 0.75, ρ = 0.9),
G(t*) is the tendency of drug-seeking behavior, defined below,
p(t*) is a value sampled from a standard uniform distribution at each
time-step t*,
P(AS) is the probability of an acute shock (e.g., P(AS) = 0.01),
d is a time-steps counter, reset to 0 when a new AS(t*) arises, and
+
τ1 and τ2 are constants ∈ " with τ2 > τ1 (e.g., τ1 = 20, τ2 = 60 [hour]).
(Equation S18) Acute trauma - AP
 P
if G(t*) < 0 and p(t*) < P(AP) or if d ∈ [1, τ 1 ]
 0
AP(t*) =  ρ ⋅ AP(t * −1) if d ∈ [τ 1, τ 2 ]

otherwise,
 0
where
+
P0 and ρ are constants ∈ ! (e.g., P0 = 0.45, ρ = 0.4),
G(t*) is the tendency of drug-seeking behavior, defined below,
p(t*) is a value sampled from a standard uniform distribution at each
time-step t*,
P(AP) is the probability of an acute shock (e.g., P(AP) = 0.03),
d is a time-steps counter, reset to 0 when a new AP(t*) arises, and
+
τ1 and τ2 are constants ∈ " with τ2 > τ1 (e.g., τ1 = 15, τ2 = 50 [hour]).
(Equation S19) Acute drug priming - AD
 D
if G(t*) > 0 and p(t*) < P(AD) or if d ∈ [1, τ 1 ]
 0
AD(t*) =  ρ ⋅ AD(t * −1) if d ∈ [τ 1, τ 2 ]

otherwise,
 0
where
+

D0 and ρ are constants ∈ ! (e.g., D0 = 0.75, ρ = 0.9),
G(t*) is the tendency of drug-seeking behavior, defined below,
p(t*) is a value sampled from a standard uniform distribution at each
time-step t*,
P(AD) is the probability of an acute shock (e.g., P(AD) = 0.03),
d is a time-steps counter, reset to 0 when a new AD(t*) arises, and
+
τ1 and τ2 are constants ∈ " with τ2 > τ1 (e.g., τ1 = 5, τ2 = 30 [hour]).

127

!
(Equation S20) Acute drug cue - AQ
 Q(t*)

 AQ(t * −1)
AQ(t*) = 
 ρ ⋅ AQ(t * −1)
 0


if p(t*) < P(AQ)
if d ∈ [1, τ 1 ]
if d ∈ [τ 1, τ 2 ]
otherwise,

where
Q(t*) is the saliency to drug cues, defined above,
+
ρ is a constants ∈ ! (e.g., ρ = 0.9),
p(t*) is a value sampled from a standard uniform distribution at each
time-step t*,
P(AQ) is the probability of an acute shock (e.g., P(AQ) = 0.02),
d is a time-steps counter, reset to 0 when a new AQ(t*) arises, and
+
τ1 and τ2 are constants ∈ " with τ2 > τ1 (e.g., τ1 = 20, τ2 = 40 [hour]).

MM5. Behavioral scale
(Equation S21) Tendency of drug-seeking behavior - G
G(t*) = I ⋅ cs(t*) − C ⋅ (1− cs(t*)) ,
where
I and C are a constant (e.g., I = 1, C = 1),
cs(t*) is the cognitive state, defined above.
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APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES

This Appendix reports the supplementary figures discussed in Chapter 6.
The abbreviation SEM stands for standard error of the mean.

129

!

!

130
!

Figure 20: Details of the baseline presented in Figure 13 (TS and T0 are constant). Simulations of virtual behavior for cigarette consumption
over a period of 160 days. Cigarettes are available on the fifth day. Results are the average of 100 runs when both TS and T0 are constant. Column
A reports the evolution of drug-seeking behavior G; column B the progression of internal processes stress S (red), pain P (blue), and drug craving
D (black); column C the internal process of saliency to drug cues Q (red) and external trigger acute drug cue AQ (blue); column D the external
triggers of acute shock AS (red), acute trauma AP (blue), and acute drug priming AD (black); column E the rush/comedown effect rc of drug
intakes; and column F the cognitive distortion cd. The gray shades correspond to SEM. The simulation time-scales are multiple: hours for columns
A-D, and minutes for columns E-F.
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Figure 21: Details of Case Study 1 presented in Figures 14 and 15. Simulations of virtual behavior for cigarette consumption over a period of
160 days. Cigarettes are available on the fifth day. Results are the average of 100 runs. Evaluation 1 simulates both TS and T0 as time-dependent
processes. TS is constant and T0 time-dependent in Evaluation 2, TS is time-dependent and T0 constant in Evaluation 3. Column A reports the
evolution of drug-seeking behavior G; column B the progression of internal processes stress S (red), pain P (blue), and drug craving D (black);
column C the internal process of saliency to drug cues Q (red) and external trigger acute drug cue AQ (blue); column D the external triggers of
acute shock AS (red), acute trauma AP (blue), and acute drug priming AD (black); column E the rush/comedown effect rc of drug intakes; and
column F the cognitive distortion cd. The gray shades correspond to SEM. The simulation time-scales are multiple: hours for columns A-D, and
minutes for columns E-F.
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Figure 22: Comparison of different probabilities defining the associative learning between the drug and its pleasurable effect.
Simulations of virtual behavior for cigarette consumption over a period of 160 days. Cigarettes are available on the fifth day. Results are the
average of 100 runs. For the first number of consumed cigarettes, alterations of ωS, ωP, and ωD facilitating maladaptive behavior occur with arbitrary
probabilities. Three sets of probabilities P(Zηi), with i ∈ {S, P, D} are tested: [0.05, 0.025, 0.0125], [0.2, 0.1, 0.05], and [0.8, 0.4, 0.2]. Column A reports
the evolution of cognitive weights ωS (red), ωP (blue), and ωD (black); column B the progression of T (blue), TS (black), and T0 (red); column C the
virtual subject's mood; and column D the average number of drug intakes (red), and the sobriety index (blue) over time. The gray shades in
columns A, B, and C corresponds to SEM. The abscissas correspond to the simulation's time-steps: hours in column A; minutes in columns B-C;
and days in column D. Maladaptive behavior is facilitated for higher probabilities. Simulations using lower probabilities terminate with the virtual
subject exhibiting an average consumption of ~30 intakes/day and a sobriety index of ~30%. Higher probabilities lead these predicted measures to
~45 intakes/day and ~2% sobriety. The downslope of M becomes stronger as the probabilities become larger.
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Figure 23: Details of simulations presented in Figure 22. Simulations of virtual behavior for cigarette consumption over a period of 160 days.
Cigarettes are available on the fifth day. Results are the average of 100 runs. For the first number of consumed cigarettes, alterations of ωS, ωP,
and ωD facilitating maladaptive behavior occur with arbitrary probabilities. Three sets of probabilities P(Zηi), with i ∈ {S, P, D} are tested: [0.05,
0.025, 0.0125], [0.2, 0.1, 0.05], and [0.8, 0.4, 0.2]. Column A reports the evolution of drug-seeking behavior G; column B the progression of internal
processes stress S (red), pain P (blue), and drug craving D (black); column C the internal process of saliency to drug cues Q (red) and external
trigger acute drug cue AQ (blue); column D the external triggers of acute shock AS (red), acute trauma AP (blue), and acute drug priming AD
(black); column E the rush/comedown effect rc of drug intakes; and column F the cognitive distortion cd. The gray shades correspond to SEM. The
abscissas correspond to the simulation's time-steps: hours in columns A-D, and minutes in columns E-F.
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Figure 24: Details of Case Study 2 presented in Figures 16 and 17. Simulations of virtual behavior for cigarette consumption over a period of
160 days. Cigarettes are available on the fifth day. Results are the average of 100 runs. Evaluation 1 simulates both TS and T0 as time-dependent
processes. TS is constant and T0 time-dependent in Evaluation 2, TS is time-dependent and T0 constant in Evaluation 3. In all Evaluations, the
recovery process H is activated at t = 1920 and t = 2280 [hours] (in light pink) and stays active for 120 hours (dark pink). Column A reports the
evolution of drug-seeking behavior G; column B the progression of internal processes stress S (red), pain P (blue), and drug craving D (black);
column C the internal process of saliency to drug cues Q (red) and external trigger acute drug cue AQ (blue); column D the external triggers of
acute shock AS (red), acute trauma AP (blue), and acute drug priming AD (black); column E the rush/comedown effect rc of drug intakes; and
column F the cognitive distortion cd. The gray shades correspond to SEM. The simulation time-scales are multiple: hours for columns A-D, and
minutes for columns E-F.
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Figure 25: Comparison of different probabilities defining the durability of H for conventional therapies, with both TS and T0 timedependent. Simulations of virtual behavior for cigarette consumption over a period of 160 days. Cigarettes are available on the fifth day. Results
are the average of 100 runs. The recovery process H is activated at t = 1920 and t = 2280 [hours] (in light pink) and stays active for 120 hours (dark
pink). At the end of each therapeutic session, the positive influence that H exerts on ωS, ωP, and ωD become permanent or disappears, depending
on arbitrary probabilities. Three sets of probabilities P(Hηi), with i ∈ {S, P, D}, are tested: [0.2, 0.175, 0.15], [0.4, 0.35, 0.3], and [0.8, 0.7, 0.6]. Column
A reports the evolution of cognitive weights ωS (red), ωP (blue), and ωD (black); column B the progression of T (blue), TS (black), and T0 (red);
column C the virtual subject's mood; and column D the average number of drug intakes (red), and the sobriety index (blue) over time. The gray
shades in columns A, B, and C corresponds to SEM. The abscissas correspond to the simulation's time-steps: hours in column A; minutes in
columns B-C; and days in column D. The trial employing the lowest probabilities terminates at advanced stage 4 (~25 intakes/day and ~41%
sobriety), whereas the highest set of probabilities leads to stage 1 or intermediate stage 2 (~3.5 intakes/day and ~88% sobriety).
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Figure 26: Details of simulations presented in Figure 25. Simulations of virtual behavior for cigarette consumption over a period of 160 days.
Cigarettes are available on the fifth day. Results are the average of 100 runs. The recovery process H is activated at t = 1920 and t = 2280 [hours]
(in light pink) and stays active for 120 hours (dark pink). At the end of each therapeutic session, the positive influence that H exerts on ωS, ωP, and
ωD become permanent or disappears, depending on arbitrary probabilities. Three sets of probabilities P(Hηi), with i ∈ {S, P, D}, are tested: [0.2,
0.175, 0.15], [0.4, 0.35, 0.3], and [0.8, 0.7, 0.6]. Column A reports the evolution of drug-seeking behavior G; column B the progression of internal
processes stress S (red), pain P (blue), and drug craving D (black); column C the internal process of saliency to drug cues Q (red) and external
trigger acute drug cue AQ (blue); column D the external triggers of acute shock AS (red), acute trauma AP (blue), and acute drug priming AD
(black); column E the rush/comedown effect rc of drug intakes; and column F the cognitive distortion cd. The gray shades correspond to SEM. The
abscissas correspond to the simulation's time-steps: hours in columns A-D, and minutes in columns E-F.
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Figure 27: Comparison of different probabilities defining the durability of H for conventional therapies, with TS constant. Simulations of
virtual behavior for cigarette consumption over a period of 160 days. Cigarettes are available on the fifth day. Results are the average of 100 runs.
The recovery process H is activated at t = 1920 and t = 2280 [hours] (in light pink) and stays active for 120 hours (dark pink). These simulations use
the same experimental setup employed in Figure 25 but have constant TS. At the end of each therapeutic session, the positive influence that H
exerts on ωS, ωP, and ωD become permanent or disappears, depending on arbitrary probabilities. Three sets of probabilities P(Hηi), with i ∈ {S, P,
D}, are tested: [0.2, 0.175, 0.15], [0.4, 0.35, 0.3], and [0.8, 0.7, 0.6]. Column A reports the evolution of cognitive weights ωS (red), ωP (blue), and ωD
(black); column B the progression of T (blue), TS (black), and T0 (red); column C the virtual subject's mood; and column D the average number of
drug intakes (red), and the sobriety index (blue) over time. The gray shades in columns A, B, and C corresponds to SEM. The abscissas
correspond to the simulation's time-steps: hours in column A; minutes in columns B-C; and days in column D.

!

!

138
!

Figure 28: Details of simulations presented in Figure 27. Simulations of virtual behavior for cigarette consumption over a period of 160 days.
Cigarettes are available on the fifth day. Results are the average of 100 runs. The recovery process H is activated at t = 1920 and t = 2280 [hours]
(in light pink) and stays active for 120 hours (dark pink). These simulations use the same experimental setup employed in Figure 26 but have
constant TS. At the end of each therapeutic session, the positive influence that H exerts on ωS, ωP, and ωD become permanent or disappears,
depending on arbitrary probabilities. Three sets of probabilities P(Hηi), with i ∈ {S, P, D}, are tested: [0.2, 0.175, 0.15], [0.4, 0.35, 0.3], and [0.8, 0.7,
0.6]. Column A reports the evolution of drug-seeking behavior G; column B the progression of internal processes stress S (red), pain P (blue), and
drug craving D (black); column C the internal process of saliency to drug cues Q (red) and external trigger acute drug cue AQ (blue); column D the
external triggers of acute shock AS (red), acute trauma AP (blue), and acute drug priming AD (black); column E the rush/comedown effect rc of
drug intakes; and column F the cognitive distortion cd. The gray shades correspond to SEM. The abscissas correspond to the simulation's timesteps: hours in columns A-D, and minutes in columns E-F.
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Figure 29: Comparison of different probabilities defining the durability of H for conventional therapies, with T0 constant. Simulations of
virtual behavior for cigarette consumption over a period of 160 days. Cigarettes are available on the fifth day. Results are the average of 100 runs.
The recovery process H is activated at t = 1920 and t = 2280 [hours] (in light pink) and stays active for 120 hours (dark pink). These simulations use
the same experimental setup employed in Figure 25 but have constant TS. At the end of each therapeutic session, the positive influence that H
exerts on ωS, ωP, and ωD become permanent or disappears, depending on arbitrary probabilities. Three sets of probabilities P(Hηi), with i ∈ {S, P,
D}, are tested: [0.2, 0.175, 0.15], [0.4, 0.35, 0.3], and [0.8, 0.7, 0.6]. Column A reports the evolution of cognitive weights ωS (red), ωP (blue), and ωD
(black); column B the progression of T (blue), TS (black), and T0 (red); column C the virtual subject's mood; and column D the average number of
drug intakes (red), and the sobriety index (blue) over time. The gray shades in columns A, B, and C corresponds to SEM. The abscissas
correspond to the simulation's time-steps: hours in column A; minutes in columns B-C; and days in column D.
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Figure 30: Details of simulations presented in Figure 29. Simulations of virtual behavior for cigarette consumption over a period of 160 days.
Cigarettes are available on the fifth day. Results are the average of 100 runs. The recovery process H is activated at t = 1920 and t = 2280 [hours]
(in light pink) and stays active for 120 hours (dark pink). These simulations use the same experimental setup employed in Figure 26 but have
constant TS. At the end of each therapeutic session, the positive influence that H exerts on ωS, ωP, and ωD become permanent or disappears,
depending on arbitrary probabilities. Three sets of probabilities P(Hηi), with i ∈ {S, P, D}, are tested: [0.2, 0.175, 0.15], [0.4, 0.35, 0.3], and [0.8, 0.7,
0.6]. Column A reports the evolution of drug-seeking behavior G; column B the progression of internal processes stress S (red), pain P (blue), and
drug craving D (black); column C the internal process of saliency to drug cues Q (red) and external trigger acute drug cue AQ (blue); column D the
external triggers of acute shock AS (red), acute trauma AP (blue), and acute drug priming AD (black); column E the rush/comedown effect rc of
drug intakes; and column F the cognitive distortion cd. The gray shades correspond to SEM. The abscissas correspond to the simulation's timesteps: hours in columns A-D, and minutes in columns E-F.
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Figure 31: Details of Case Study 3 presented in Figures 18 and 19. Simulations of virtual behavior for cigarette consumption over a period of
160 days. Cigarettes are available on the fifth day. Results are the average of 100 runs. Evaluation 1 simulates both TS and T0 as time-dependent
processes. TS is constant and T0 time-dependent in Evaluation 2, TS is time-dependent and T0 constant in Evaluation 3. In all Evaluations, the
recovery process H is activated at t ∈ {1920, 1960, 2000, 2040, 2280, 2320, 2360, 2400} [hours] (in light pink) and stays active for 15 hours (dark
pink). Column A reports the evolution of drug-seeking behavior G; column B the progression of internal processes stress S (red), pain P (blue), and
drug craving D (black); column C the internal process of saliency to drug cues Q (red) and external trigger acute drug cue AQ (blue); column D the
external triggers of acute shock AS (red), acute trauma AP (blue), and acute drug priming AD (black); column E the rush/comedown effect rc of
drug intakes; and column F the cognitive distortion cd. The gray shades correspond to SEM. The simulation time-scales are multiple: hours for
columns A-D, and minutes for columns E-F.
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Figure 32: Comparison of different probabilities defining the durability of H for alternative treatments, with both TS and T0 timedependent. Simulations of virtual behavior for cigarette consumption over a period of 160 days. Cigarettes are available on the fifth day. Results
are the average of 100 runs. The recovery process H is activated at t ∈ {1920, 1960, 2000, 2040, 2280, 2320, 2360, 2400} [hours] (in light pink) and
stays active for 15 hours (dark pink). At the end of each therapeutic session, the positive influence that H exerts on ωS, ωP, and ωD become
permanent or disappears, depending on arbitrary probabilities. Three sets of probabilities P(Hηi), with i ∈ {S, P, D}, are tested: [0.2, 0.175, 0.15],
[0.4, 0.35, 0.3], and [0.8, 0.7, 0.6]. Column A reports the evolution of cognitive weights ωS (red), ωP (blue), and ωD (black); column B the progression
of T (blue), TS (black), and T0 (red); column C the virtual subject's mood; and column D the average number of drug intakes (red), and the sobriety
index (blue) over time. The gray shades in columns A, B, and C corresponds to SEM. The abscissas correspond to the simulation's time-steps:
hours in column A; minutes in columns B-C; and days in column D. Lowest probabilities terminates at advanced stage 1 or intermediate stage 2
(~4 intakes/day and ~85% sobriety), whereas highest probabilities lead the virtual subject to cease using the drug.
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Figure 33: Details of simulations presented in Figure 32. Simulations of virtual behavior for cigarette consumption over a period of 160 days.
Cigarettes are available on the fifth day. Results are the average of 100 runs. The recovery process H is activated at t ∈ {1920, 1960, 2000, 2040,
2280, 2320, 2360, 2400} [hours] (in light pink) and stays active for 15 hours (dark pink). At the end of each therapeutic session, the positive influence
that H exerts on ωS, ωP, and ωD become permanent or disappears, depending on arbitrary probabilities. Three sets of probabilities P(Hηi), with i ∈
{S, P, D}, are tested: [0.2, 0.175, 0.15], [0.4, 0.35, 0.3], and [0.8, 0.7, 0.6]. Column A reports the evolution of drug-seeking behavior G; column B the
progression of internal processes stress S (red), pain P (blue), and drug craving D (black); column C the internal process of saliency to drug cues
Q (red) and external trigger acute drug cue AQ (blue); column D the external triggers of acute shock AS (red), acute trauma AP (blue), and acute
drug priming AD (black); column E the rush/comedown effect rc of drug intakes; and column F the cognitive distortion cd. The gray shades
correspond to SEM. The abscissas correspond to the simulation's time-steps: hours in columns A-D, and minutes in columns E-F.
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Figure 34: Comparison of different probabilities defining the durability of H for alternative treatments, with TS constant. Simulations of
virtual behavior for cigarette consumption over a period of 160 days. Cigarettes are available on the fifth day. Results are the average of 100 runs.
The recovery process H is activated at t ∈ {1920, 1960, 2000, 2040, 2280, 2320, 2360, 2400} [hours] (in light pink) and stays active for 15 hours (dark
pink). These simulations use the same experimental setup employed in Figure 32 but have constant TS. At the end of each therapeutic session, the
positive influence that H exerts on ωS, ωP, and ωD become permanent or disappears, depending on arbitrary probabilities. Three sets of
probabilities P(Hηi), with i ∈ {S, P, D}, are tested: [0.2, 0.175, 0.15], [0.4, 0.35, 0.3], and [0.8, 0.7, 0.6]. Column A reports the evolution of cognitive
weights ωS (red), ωP (blue), and ωD (black); column B the progression of T (blue), TS (black), and T0 (red); column C the virtual subject's mood; and
column D the average number of drug intakes (red), and the sobriety index (blue) over time. The gray shades in columns A, B, and C corresponds
to SEM. The abscissas correspond to the simulation's time-steps: hours in column A; minutes in columns B-C; and days in column D.
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Figure 35: Details of simulations presented in Figure 34. Simulations of virtual behavior for cigarette consumption over a period of 160 days.
Cigarettes are available on the fifth day. Results are the average of 100 runs. The recovery process H is activated at t ∈ {1920, 1960, 2000, 2040,
2280, 2320, 2360, 2400} [hours] (in light pink) and stays active for 15 hours (dark pink). These simulations use the same experimental setup
employed in Figure 33 but have constant TS. At the end of each therapeutic session, the positive influence that H exerts on ωS, ωP, and ωD become
permanent or disappears, depending on arbitrary probabilities. Three sets of probabilities P(Hηi), with i ∈ {S, P, D}, are tested: [0.2, 0.175, 0.15],
[0.4, 0.35, 0.3], and [0.8, 0.7, 0.6]. Column A reports the evolution of drug-seeking behavior G; column B the progression of internal processes stress
S (red), pain P (blue), and drug craving D (black); column C the internal process of saliency to drug cues Q (red) and external trigger acute drug
cue AQ (blue); column D the external triggers of acute shock AS (red), acute trauma AP (blue), and acute drug priming AD (black); column E the
rush/comedown effect rc of drug intakes; and column F the cognitive distortion cd. The gray shades correspond to SEM. The abscissas correspond
to the simulation's time-steps: hours in columns A-D, and minutes in columns E-F.
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Figure 36: Comparison of different probabilities defining the durability of H for alternative treatments, with T0 constant. Simulations of
virtual behavior for cigarette consumption over a period of 160 days. Cigarettes are available on the fifth day. Results are the average of 100 runs.
The recovery process H is activated at t ∈ {1920, 1960, 2000, 2040, 2280, 2320, 2360, 2400} [hours] (in light pink) and stays active for 15 hours (dark
pink). These simulations use the same experimental setup employed in Figure 32 but have constant T0. At the end of each therapeutic session, the
positive influence that H exerts on ωS, ωP, and ωD become permanent or disappears, depending on arbitrary probabilities. Three sets of
probabilities P(Hηi), with i ∈ {S, P, D}, are tested: [0.2, 0.175, 0.15], [0.4, 0.35, 0.3], and [0.8, 0.7, 0.6]. Column A reports the evolution of cognitive
weights ωS (red), ωP (blue), and ωD (black); column B the progression of T (blue), TS (black), and T0 (red); column C the virtual subject's mood; and
column D the average number of drug intakes (red), and the sobriety index (blue) over time. The gray shades in columns A, B, and C corresponds
to SEM. The abscissas correspond to the simulation's time-steps: hours in column A; minutes in columns B-C; and days in column D.
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Figure 37: Details of simulations presented in Figure 36. Simulations of virtual behavior for cigarette consumption over a period of 160 days.
Cigarettes are available on the fifth day. Results are the average of 100 runs. The recovery process H is activated at t ∈ {1920, 1960, 2000, 2040,
2280, 2320, 2360, 2400} [hours] (in light pink) and stays active for 15 hours (dark pink). These simulations use the same experimental setup
employed in Figure 33 but have constant T0. At the end of each therapeutic session, the positive influence that H exerts on ωS, ωP, and ωD become
permanent or disappears, depending on arbitrary probabilities. Three sets of probabilities P(Hηi), with i ∈ {S, P, D}, are tested: [0.2, 0.175, 0.15],
[0.4, 0.35, 0.3], and [0.8, 0.7, 0.6]. Column A reports the evolution of drug-seeking behavior G; column B the progression of internal processes stress
S (red), pain P (blue), and drug craving D (black); column C the internal process of saliency to drug cues Q (red) and external trigger acute drug
cue AQ (blue); column D the external triggers of acute shock AS (red), acute trauma AP (blue), and acute drug priming AD (black); column E the
rush/comedown effect rc of drug intakes; and column F the cognitive distortion cd. The gray shades correspond to SEM. The abscissas correspond
to the simulation's time-steps: hours in columns A-D, and minutes in columns E-F.
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APPENDIX C
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLE

Table 2: Values of the parameters as used in Figures 13 to 37.

Eq.
S1,S9
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6

S7

S8

Parameter
N/A
α
β
∆
γ
α
Tmax
T50
D
k12
Vb
TS(0)
β
γ
λ
T0(0)
δT0
α
ωQ
ωA
ωH
αS(0)
αP(0)
αD(0)
P(HηS)
P(HηP)
P(HηD)

S10

P(ZηS)
P(ZηP)
P(ZηD)

υS
υP
υD
ηS
ηP

Value
N/A
40
60
10
0.3
30
120
588.6
250
0.0054
1.67
75
0.05
0.05
100
100
0.03
20
0.28
0.35
0.8
0.7
1.2
1
0.2, 0.4, 0.8
0.175, 0.35,
0.7
0.8, 0.7, 0.6
0.05, 0.1, 0.2,
0.4, 0.8
0.025, 0.05,
0.1, 0.2, 0.4
0.0125, 0.025,
0.05, 0.1, 0.2
–0.26
0.42
–0.32
–0.1
0.05

S11
S12
S13
S14
S15

S16

S17

S18

S19

S20

S21
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ηD
α
β
γ
δi
δd
β
γ
β
γ
τ
β
γ
τ
β
γ
S0
ρ
P(AS)
τ1
τ2
P0
ρ
P(AP)
τ1
τ2
D0
ρ
P(AD)
τ1
τ2
ρ
P(AQ)
τ1
τ2
I
C

–0.15
0.25
0.85
–0.4052
15
1
0.002
0.002
0.0002
0.01
20
0.00002
0.002
10
0.002
0.0005
0.75
0.9
0.01
20
60
0.45
0.4
0.03
15
50
0.65
0.55
0.03
5
30
0.9
0.02
20
40
1
1
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